The Scottish Institute for **Policing Research**

Policing: Connecting Evidence and Practice
SIPR Annual Lectures, 2007–2012

Contents

Preface

In 2007 the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) was established as a strategic collaboration between Scotland's universities[1] and the Scottish police service. Its key aims are:

- To undertake high quality independent and relevant research;
- To support knowledge exchange between researchers and practitioners in order to improve the evidence base for policing policy and practice;
- To expand and develop the research capacity in Scotland's universities and the police service;
- To promote the development of national and international links with research, practitioner and policy communities.

Supported by investment from the Scottish police service, Scottish Funding Council and universities, SIPR has rapidly become established as a leading international centre for policing research and as an exemplar of collaborative working between the police and research community[2]. As part of its mission to advance evidence-based practices in policing, the Institute initiated the SIPR Annual Lecture programme to create an opportunity for leading scholars and practitioners to share their knowledge about the role of evidence in understanding and improving police effectiveness and public safety. Drawing large audiences from the worlds of policing, policy, politics and research, these lectures have been a huge success, stimulating debate and discussion about the nature and development of contemporary policing.

Against a background of a growing recognition of the value of evidence-based approaches to policing, this booklet contains five SIPR Annual Lectures delivered between 2007 and 2012 by Wesley Skogan (Northwestern University), Lawrence Sherman (University of Cambridge), Nick Tilley (University College, London), Betsy Stanko (Metropolitan Police Service) and Peter Neyroud (University of Cambridge). Each speaker drew on their wealth of experience and distinguished record of academic and professional achievement to craft lectures which offer compelling arguments and illustrations of how research evidence can be used to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of policing. From improving police-community relations and public confidence to tackling hot spots of crime and disorder; from understanding better the uses of police discretion to the importance of evidence-based approaches for developing the professional status of policing, each of the lectures mobilizes a range of research to address key issues and innovations in contemporary policing as well as highlighting important challenges for the future. Collectively the lectures also show the richness of the 'supply' of research evidence across different areas of policing as well as the growing 'demand' from within police organizations to integrate evidence-based approaches into policy and practice.

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[1] Abertay Dundee, Dundee, Edinburgh, Edinburgh Napier, Glasgow, Glasgow Caledonian, Heriot-Watt, Robert Gordon, St Andrews, Stirling, Strathclyde and the West of Scotland Universities

[2] Engel, R.S. and Henderson, S. (2013) identify SIPR as an example of international best practice for police-academic partnerships, arguing that 'structured collaborations that span multiple universities and police agencies will be most effective at advancing evidence-based practices in policing agencies' See Engel, R.S. and Henderson, S. (2013) 'Beyond rhetoric: establishing police-academic partnerships that work', in J. Brown (editor) The Future of Policing (London:

There is, of course, more to be done to increase the receptivity of the police service to research but huge progress has been made over the last 20 years[3]. Institutions and organisations like the Society of Evidence-Based Policing, the College of Policing and SIPR are all indicative of the momentum that has developed around the evidence agenda and are playing key roles in working collaboratively with the police to advance and embed evidence-based practices.

Bringing together this first set of SIPR annual lectures also provides me with an opportunity to thank the many organisations and people who support SIPR and without whom our annual lecture programme would not be possible. Investment from Police Scotland, the Scottish Funding Council and the consortium universities underpins all of SIPR's activities and I am hugely grateful for their continuing support. I would also like to thank Apex Scotland who were our partners for the first SIPR annual lecture in 2007 and to Alpha Translating & Interpreting Services Ltd who have sponsored the subsequent lectures. Each year we have been fortunate in being able to hold our annual lecture in splendid venues and I would like to thank The Society of Writers to Her Majesty's Signet (The WS Society), the Scottish Police College and the Universities of Edinburgh and Strathclyde for hosting our annual lectures over the past five years. The detailed organisation of each lecture is the responsibility of SIPR's Knowledge Exchange Manager, Tim Heilbronn, and I am very grateful to him for his hard work in ensuring the smooth running of these events and to Peter Wilson QPM for his skillful chairing of each of the lectures. Janine Hunter (University of Dundee) has done an excellent job in converting audio recordings of the lectures into text, and Angela Dunphy (University of Dundee, Design Print Marketing Department) has used her expert skills on the graphic design of this publication. Finally, the success of the SIPR Annual Lectures ultimately reflects the quality of the presentations made by the speakers so I would like to thank them for their excellent contributions and their assistance in preparing their lectures for this publication.

Professor Nicholas Fyfe
Director,
Scottish Institute for Policing Research

[3] See Sherman, L. (2013) 'Targeting, Testing and Tracking Police Services: The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing, 1975-2025', in M. Tonry (editor) Crime and Justice in America 1975-2025 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

Leadership from Bottom to Top: Community Policing in Chicago[4]

Wesley G. Skogan
Institute for Policy Research/Political Science
Northwestern University
Chicago, USA

Biography

Professor Wesley Skogan has been a faculty member at Northwestern University since 1971, and has held joint appointments with the Political Science Department and the University's Institute for Policy Research. His research focuses on the interface between the public and the legal system, in crime prevention, victim services, and community-oriented policing. Since 1993 he has directed an evaluation of Chicago's experimental citywide community policing initiative. His books on this project include: *Police and Community in Chicago* (2006), *On the Beat: Police and Community Problem Solving* (1999), and *Community Policing, Chicago Style* (1997). In 2003 he edited a collection of original essays on innovation in policing, *Community Policing: Can It Work?* His 1990 book, *Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Cities* won an award from the American Sociological Association. He was a technical consultant for the Home Office Research Unit during the development of the British Crime Survey, and has written two Home Office Research Series reports on contacts between the police and public in England and Wales.

Foreword

My remarks on community policing were delivered at the 2007 Apex/SIPR Lecture, which was held in the historic Signet Library in Edinburgh. This wonderful venue brought together leaders of Scotland's criminal justice community and others. I was visiting Scotland at the invitation of the Scottish Institute for Policing Research, a joint research venture of the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland, the Scottish Funding Council and 12 universities. As I learned, Apex and the Institute both are dedicated to monitoring and evaluation in their areas of responsibility, strengthening the evidence base on which policy and practice are based. This fitted well with my discussion of the largest community policing experiment in America, which was based on a thirteen year evaluation of its effectiveness. The audience was large and participants asked excellent questions. Scotland is well served by the awareness and mutual respect that cross-institutional collaborations of this sort engender.

Professor Wesley Skogan
March 2013

[4] Held, in partnership with Apex Scotland, at the Signet Library, 11 September 2007

Today I will discuss some of the fundamentals of Chicago's community policing programme and the thirteen year evaluation that we conducted to monitor its implementation and effectiveness. Chicago's programme officially began in April of 1993, after a surprisingly short development period during which senior department managers, outside consultants and staff from the Mayor's office crafted a plan for the city. Then, over the next two years, they refined the programme by testing and reworking it in several test areas. For police purposes, Chicago is divided into 280 small police beats, which are grouped into 25 districts, and the experiment was carried out in five of them, over a two-year period. The planners took a flexible, 'maybe we can make it work and maybe we have to reformulate it' approach, getting it off the ground rapidly rather than taking years to over-plan it. This gave us evaluators a very valuable period during which police in most of the city were conducting their business as usual. In the prototype districts, by contrast, police had some extra resources and a great deal of management attention and extra training. There they reorganised themselves in a way that eventually the entire city would emulate. My first book on policing in Chicago took advantage of differences in what happened in these prototype districts and elsewhere, to document the impact of the programme.

The first component of Chicago's programme is to decentralise and devolve responsibility down in the organisation, closer to where police meet the public and the work gets done. In Chicago, this meant breathing new life into the 280 small beats. The department created what are called 'beat teams'; these are groups of about nine officers who, in the main, provide staffing for a beat car that is assigned to an area 24/7. Of course, other officers occasionally get dispatched to handle work overloads; but the goal of the computerised dispatching system is to keep the beat cars busy answering calls from their area.

As you might note, this indicates that Chicago chose not to go the 'special unit' route. Many American and UK cities have tried to staff their community policing programmes with officers who are released from the routines of 'real' police work, but that almost inevitably leads to trouble. One liability of special units is that officers are constantly being siphoned off for other, seemingly more pressing duties; and Chicago knew from its investigations that this was a difficulty they wanted to avoid. Another was that special units can lead to morale problems. In Fort Worth, Texas, for example, special community policing officers came to be known as 'empty holster guys,' and were dismissed by the rest of the force. In other cities, what they do is known as 'wave and smile policing,' and NOP – Neighbourhood Oriented Policing – comes to be known as 'Nobody on Patrol'. So, by organising teams that would spend their time answering calls like everyone else, only just in one neighbourhood, Chicago hoped to avoid the morale and organisational problems that plague special units. This strategy also avoided a charge that had come up in other cities, that taking officers away from patrol would put the community at risk. In Chicago, beat teams do police work most of the time. The 911 emergency call system manages their workload, so a) they answer calls that come from their beat; and b) so they're not fully occupied, and have other things that they can also do during the course of their tour. The teams work under a beat sergeant, who is responsible for quarterly meetings at which they talk about what's up, and make plans for the next quarter.

At the same time, Chicago changed to fixed work shifts, moving away from a rotating shift pattern which used to be very common in the United States. Before, over the course of several months, officers would work their way all around the clock. But to build stable relationships with the public you need stable shift assignments.

The next key development was to provide vehicles for public involvement in the programme. In many American cities, public involvement consists of a committee of the great and the good that meets occasionally with the chief of police. It is a bit exciting for them; they get special, behind the scenes tours, some crime statistics and crime maps, and they feel like 'insiders'. But they meet once a quarter, and nothing apparently happens, except that they have an interesting chat.

Instead, Chicago chose to develop a system to fit the devolution of responsibility in the organisation down to beats, and what they came up with is one of the most unique aspects of the city's programme. Police and civic leaders come from all over the world to see beat meetings in action. The meetings are to be held each month, and on average, they actually meet about ten times a year. Each has a regular schedule – for example, the first Tuesday of the month – and they meet in the same location each time. They are held in venues like church basements and social halls and in park buildings; and it is the responsibility of the beat sergeant to secure a location where they can meet regularly. An average of five police officers attend; most are members of the beat team, and several officers who are off duty at the time of the meetings are paid overtime to be there. The beat sergeant is typically there, and often specialists from niches in the department such as the gang unit are there because of special concerns expressed by local residents. But the key is that most of the officers work in the beat, driving around and answering calls, and they are the very people who are likely to show up at participants' doorsteps if they call the emergency number. These officers have direct responsibility for dealing with the concerns that come up during the meetings as well.

The average meeting lasts about 70 minutes, and the officers have been trained to follow the same general agenda. First, there is a presentation and discussion of crime patterns. When you arrive at the meeting there is always a 'welcome table' where you sign in and pick up information packets. Attendees typically get a crime map, and if the last meeting turned out to focus on aggravated assault, there'll be a map of all the assaults in the beat in the last 30 days. There is a standard analytic report called a 'Top Ten List', which provides information about the ten most frequent crimes in this beat during the last month. Often there will be summary reports about arrests in the area and a crime prevention brochure or two. These materials will be available in English, Spanish and Polish, which is the next most requested foreign language in Chicago.

Turnout at these meetings has been solid and very stable. It varies with the weather – we have serious weather in Chicago, as you may have heard – and September is our best month; that's when you should visit, and it is also the peak month for participation. Initially there was concern that, after a while, attendance would fade, when the novelty of trundling down to your local church hall and meeting with the police wore off. However, turnout has been running at a steady 65,000 to 67,000 attendees per year. Between 1993 and 2003, there were just over 600,000 participants in the meetings (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Trends in Beat Meeting Attendance, 1995-2003.

The city-wide surveys we conduct show that community policing and beat meetings are very widely known. Recognition is highest among African Americans, and in fact it's in African American neighbourhoods where the programme has had its most success. As we tracked it, recognition went up steadily over time. In our last survey, 89% of African Americans (and 80% of the entire city) knew about the programme. Much of this is doubtless due to the tremendous marketing campaign that went on to get the public to come to the meetings, and to keep them informed about what they needed to know to be active participants. The programme is advertised using mass mailings, flyers and signs posted in the subway. Churches insert little flyers about local meetings in their weekly bulletins, and Chicago schoolchildren come home with information attached to their report cards. In one district, the commanders arranged to have pizzas delivered with a map and a beat meeting schedule stapled to the box. Spanish-language radio is used very extensively to reach out to Chicago's Hispanic community.

In 1995 and 1996, about 12,000 neighbourhood residents went through a three-weekend training cycle to learn about neighbourhood problem-solving from their end, and to learn about how they could become involved in community policing. Of course, police officers need the most training. Policing is a human services operation; you hire, train, and supervise your people in order to get what you want to happen. So, for example, officers and sergeants needed to learn about how to run a meeting; the department made a wonderful training video that played out a 'beat meeting from hell'. Everything goes wrong; an obstreperous heckler appears, as does a confused senior citizen. The remainder of the session consists of officers and trainers talking about how they would have handled the situations that emerged.

Who is it that attends beat meetings? To find out, we conducted rounds of observational studies in 1995, 1998 and 2002. Each time, we attended hundreds of meetings, to observe what went on and survey the residents and police who attend. We found that people who come are not a particularly representative slice of the population; this is something that every organiser of a community policing programme has to worry about. Compared with the population of their beat, the meetings over-represent homeowners, more educated people, long-term residents, senior citizens; people no longer in work, married households and families without any children living at home. In short, it is better-off and more established members of the community, with time on their hands, who learn about, and take advantage of, these opportunities to influence policing in their neighbourhood.

However, although they look different from their neighbours, it turns out that, on many dimensions, those who attend adequately represent the concerns of their neighbours. We assessed this by comparing the priority problems reported by beat meeting participants with the same measures in surveys of the general public, neighbourhood by neighbourhood. It turns out that beat meetings, by and large, do reflect the distribution of concerns in the community. Participants are more concerned than their immediate neighbours about crime and other problems – that is an important reason why they show up. But, on many measures, they do a pretty good job of reflecting community priorities. Why is this the case? I think that small is beautiful; even though participants were more likely to own their home, for example, beats are small, and everyone is still shopping at the same grocery store, walking past the same school and catching a bus at the same stop (see Figure 2). They are sharing all the visible problems in their community regardless of differences in their backgrounds.

Figure 2: Demographic representation of those attending beat meetings, home ownership amongst attendees and beat population.

Importantly, this turns out not to be true for some things that we hope could be represented at beat meetings. One of these is residents' views of the quality of police service in their community; ironically, it is people's views of policing that are least well represented at the meetings. Why is that? The principal reason is the demographic mismatch that I described; that is, demographic mismatches pile up in ways that make the meetings more police-friendly. One culprit is older residents. There is a very strong age gradient in the relationship between age and people's perceptions of the police; the older you are, the more positive you tend to be, by a very sharp margin.

The second important factor that confounds the representativeness of the meetings is race. Whites who attend beat meetings in Chicago pretty much share the views of the white population in general – they both like the police. But it turns out that African Americans who come to the beat meetings are much more positive about the police than are their neighbours. These differential racial gaps in assessments of the quality of policing ensure that beat meetings don't clearly represent the concerns of the public about the effectiveness with which they are doing their job.

One interesting factor we have tracked is the congruence between the views of participants and those of the police officers who attend the meetings and work in the area (see Figure 3). Police also fill out questionnaires at the meetings, and we have found that their perceptions of neighbourhood problems parallel those of residents to a surprising degree. Police are a little less interested in graffiti than are residents; residents are a little bit more concerned about junk and trash in the streets and alleys. But by-and-large, the priorities of the two groups resemble each other. This may be because of the repeated dialogue they engage in with participants at the meetings, but I think it is also because the turf orientation adopted by the department has brought them much closer to the problems that they, too, see as they patrol a fixed area. Now, instead of driving all over town to wherever the computer sends them to next, they stay on 'their' beat.

Priorities of Residents

Priorities of Police

Figure 3: Officer and participant ratings of neighbourhood problems.

A third aspect of Chicago's programme is interagency co-operation in problem solving. A key feature of community policing in Chicago is that it is not the police department's programme; it is the city's programme. In fact, if community policing is just the police department's programme, it is at risk of failing. Without the support of the rest of the municipal service infrastructure, it's not going to be able to carry the freight.

Chicago's model, instead, requires the active participation of many agencies: the people who tow abandoned cars and poison rats in the alleys, and the city workers who paint out graffiti. The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, politicians and civic leaders who run Chicago have bought a hundred percent into what is known as the 'broken windows' theory of crime. They believe that you can tackle some big problems by taking care of small things, as a recent police chief put it. In Chicago, tackling abandoned buildings, cars, graffiti and illegal dumping is seen as crime prevention. Fixing the broken windows is one of Chicago's approaches to crime.

Secondly, the city has this model because it fits the mayor's 'clean and green' agenda. Chicago, like many cities, is trying to compete in the global marketplace for corporate headquarters, tourists, conventions and high-tech start-ups, and how things look is very much a factor in that marketplace. Plus the mayor loves trees.

Finally, those who planned the programme knew that when people turned up at beat meetings to voice their concerns they were not going to make fine bureaucratic distinctions about who is responsible for what. If their problem is loose garbage in the alleys, they're going to stand up and complain about it. Planners knew that they had to have an affirmative response when rats in the alley came up. If they stood there and said, 'Ah, yeah, it's terrible, but that's not police business,' no-one would come back next month. Beat meetings were instead structured to pay off, without respect for bureaucratic silos. Even before they began, the coordination of a broad range of services became very much part of Chicago's programme.

CITY SERVICE REQUEST		DATE
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT		

DISTRICT _____ BEAT_____ LOCATION___ _____ ___ _____ _____
                             (NUMBERS)   (DIR)   (STREET NAME)

SERVICE DESCRIPTION:
☐ LIGHT ☐ WATER LEAK
☐ HOLE ☐ CLEAN
☐ CAVE IN ☐ BULK
☐ CART ☐ HYDRANT
☐ SIGN ☐ HEAT
☐ TREE
☐ OTHER

☐ STREET ☐ VACANT LOT
☐ CURB ☐ PARKWAY
☐ CHA ☐ MIDDLE OF STREET
☐ CORNER ☐ SIDEWALK
☐ ALLEY ☐ VIADUCT
☐ HOUSE ☐ SEWER BLOCK

☐ ALL ☐ ONE ☐ TRAFFIC
☐ OUT ☐ CUT ☐ TRIM HIGH
☐ NEW ☐ OPEN ☐ TRIM LOW
☐ PLANT ☐ STUMP ☐ DAMAGED
☐ REMOVE ☐ RESTORE
☐ MISSING ☐ REPLACE
☐ INSUFFICIENT
☐ OTHER _____

GRAFFITI REMOVAL:
MATERIAL: ☐ BRICK   PAINTED BRICK
SIDING (SPECIFY) _____
OTHER _____
OWNER (IF KNOWN) _____

WAIVER SIGNED: ☐ YES ☐ NO

ABANDONED BUILDINGS: ☐ VACANT ☐ OPEN ☐ BRICK ☐ FRAME
☐ GARAGE ☐ SECURED ☐ FLOORS _____

ABANDONED AUTOMOBILES: MAKE _____ YEAR _____
LICENCE PLATES: ☐ YES ☐ NO # _____ STATE _____ YEAR _____
CITY STICKER: ☐ YES ☐ NO # _____
HAZARDOUS AUTO: ☐ YES ☐ NO   FLOAT: ☐ FULL ☐ PARTIAL
COLOUR: _____
VIN: _____
OTHER INFORMATION: _____

CRIMINAL HOUSING TASK FORCE:
BUILDING LOCATION _____
NUMBER OF UNITS _____ OWNER'S NAME
COMPLAINT _____

NUSANCE PAY PHONE:
☐ REMOVE
☐ HUMAN SERVICES REFERRAL
☐ LIQUOR CONTROL REFERRAL

COMPLAINT INFORMATION:
NAME _____ ADDRESS _____
APT NO. _____ HOME PHONE _____ WORK PHONE _____
ORGANIZATION _____

NARRATIVE _____

REPORTING OFFICER _____ STAR NO. _____
R.D NO. _____ I & I NO. _____ _____
                     (INITIALS)

NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS OFFICER ONLY

PRIORITY (CHECK ONE)
☐ EMERGENCY
☐ NON-EMERGENCY

WHITE COPY - SEND TO MAYOR'S OFFICE OF ENQUIRY AND INFORMATION, CITY HALL, ROOM 100
BLUE COPY - RETAIN IN NEIGHBOURHOOD RELATIONS OFFICE

Figure 4: CAPS Service Request Form.

To make this happen, a system was developed that opened a special 'window' that officers could easily go to for service. At the meetings, participants' complaints get translated to service request forms (see Figure 4). Every night, the districts fax these forms downtown, where they are entered into a computer and allocated to the various departments. Each type of service has a required service time, and the clock starts to tick as soon as it goes in the computer. The mayor also has special auditors who make sure that fallen street signs have actually been put back up, that streetlights that were out have fresh bulbs, and graffiti gets cleaned up or painted over.

In Chicago, if you have a problem and come to a beat meeting, you can get it fixed. One reason for high and stable participation in the meetings is that things happen as a result. We see this in our surveys, in which over 80 percent of participants report they have seen changes take place in their neighbourhood because of things that go on at the meetings. There is pay-off from linking the meetings to services. And over time, this process has actually remade Chicago's service delivery system, enhancing its responsiveness, which was another of the mayor's goals.

The results can be seen in the data. As part of the evaluation, we track the distribution of services in Chicago. We want to see what the impact of beat meetings has been on the service delivery process. Two very frequent services that we have tracked closely are graffiti clean-ups and towing abandoned cars. When the programme started there were reputedly (no one really knew the number) more than 10,000 abandoned cars on the streets of Chicago, and getting them cleaned up was one of the big first priorities of the programme.

I will spare you the complicated statistics, but our analysis of beat meeting and service delivery data found a short list of factors that were important in determining which beats got more of what service. One important factor was resident priorities. This was measured by our city-wide surveys, aggregated to the beat level to make neighbourhood data. In areas where problems were of substantial concern, the service delivery rate was higher. At the same time, there was an additional effect of the priorities of the people who came to beat meetings; where they were concerned, the service delivery was even higher. In addition, in beats with a high turnout rate, there were more services, evidence that the 'squeaky wheel gets greased'. Finally, this is Chicago, so supporting the mayor is important. Controlling for everything else, the most important determinant of service delivery rates was the percentage of the vote that went for the incumbent mayor. This is absolutely normal in American politics, and people would be astonished if that was not true, especially because this is Chicago.


Figure 5: Service Delivery Model: factors determining which beats got more of what service

What are the challenges facing the programme in the future? The first question is, can community policing survive COMPSTAT? COMPSTAT is a hard-nosed, data driven management accountability that began in New York City. Like many cities, Chicago adopted its own versions of COMPSTAT in 2001. The problem is that what matters in data-driven management is what's measured. In COMPSTAT management meetings, which feature huge charts thrown up on high-tech LCD screens, the top brass ask commanders, 'Well, what are you doing about this drug market and what are you doing about those shootings?' The data in the department's computers are about crime, arrests, response times and crashes on the way to calls. That's what is measured, and that's what's important in this kind of accountability regime. This inevitably pushes resources away from community policing and in the direction of the traditional responsibilities of the organisation. District commanders complain that things that they think are important, that they have been fostering with the community, simply disappear from view when they are in the hot seat.

Our evaluation team has been putting some pressure on the department about this, and it has incorporated some community policing-type measures into the review process. District commanders, for example, are closely questioned about service request rates, and beat meeting turnout is an issue that they can be called on the carpet to account for. But most of the data available to analysts at headquarters focuses on traditional activities, and they inevitably become paramount.

The second question is, can community policing survive the end of great crime drop of the end of the twentieth century? Like many American cities, crime in Chicago peaked in 1991, and then began a long slide down. This freed up resources, took shootings and violent crime off the political agenda and gave departments' breathing room in which to re-engage with the community. Between 1991 and 2006, any crime with a gun in Chicago declined by 67 percent. This was a very noticeable decline, to say the least, and the biggest declines have been in African American neighbourhoods where problems were worst to begin with. But now there's a hint of a turnaround in the United States. Nationwide, the crime rate has stopped dropping, and in a number of visible cities it's begun to creep up again. Chicago's crime count has simply flattened, not crept up, but pressure from the media and from community groups in areas where the crime problem looks worse, further threatens the resources devoted to community policing.

The third question I don't know the answer to is, can Chicago's programme survive a new mayor? We've been through a number of police chiefs, and we are in the process of picking another, so I know that community policing can survive this transition. Chicago's programme is very firmly rooted in its politics and culture, and it is truly the city's programme. People run for public office with the fact that they are a community policing activist on their campaign résumé. This involvement is a big plus in neighbourhood politics. Chicagoans know their beat number, they know where their beat meetings are, and it would be very difficult to dislodge the programme politically. It could be starved for resources, but I think no politician could find it feasible to announce that they were no longer going to be a hundred percent behind the programme. We will find out someday if this is true, when our mayor-for-life finally retires, but in many cities, turnover among chiefs of police and mayors has been a real testing point for how firmly community policing is rooted in the civic culture.

Our final problem in Chicago is what to do about our new immigrants. Community policing has failed to engage with Chicago's burgeoning Latino community. Chicago is divided into three great communities: we are a simple place, populated by whites, African Americans and Hispanics, the latter overwhelmingly from Mexico (see Figure 6). The Latino fraction of the population is the only part that's growing. The white population dropped by 13 per cent between 1990 and 2000, and the black population is stable. Latino neighbourhoods are overflowing, schools there are overcrowded, and that's where the city's future lies. Community policing has been unable to successfully penetrate the large and growing barrios that have emerged in Chicago; places where you can live your entire life speaking only Spanish. Two thirds of the city's Latinos live in majority-Latino beats, and that proportion has been growing. They have become more concentrated over time, as their numbers have grown through immigration and natural growth. Finding ways to respond to this, and to engage with this community, is perhaps the city's largest challenge in this new century.

Figure 6: Chicago is grouped into 25 districts, divided into 280 small police beats, populated by whites, African Americans and Hispanics.

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Evidence based policing:
what we know, and how we know it

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Biography

Professor Sherman is Director of the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge, where he has been Wolfson Professor of Criminology since 2007. He also serves as a non-executive Director of the College of Policing (UK), as well as Director of the Cambridge Police Executive programme. His 1998 Police Foundation (US) Lecture on "Evidence-Based Policing" led to the development of the current graduate policing curriculum at Cambridge University, and is reflected in the mission of the new College to identify and promote what evidence of what works in policing. The former President of the American and International Societies of Criminology, he was elected Honorary President of the Society of Evidence-Based Policing in 2010.

Foreword

Since I delivered the SIPR Lecture at the Scottish Police College in 2009, many things have changed in evidence-based policing. My own thinking has expanded the framework to describe the "Triple-T" of EBP, presented at great detail in my contribution to Volume 42 of Crime and Justice, edited by Michael Tonry. Much more research evidence on "targeting, testing and tracking" the use of police resources is now available. Some of the planned studies described in the lecture never happened, while many others not described have been completed. The growth of randomized experiments in UK policing has been astonishing, and we have many young police leaders to thank. Many of them came to Scotland in early 2013 for a SIPR-sponsored meeting of the Society for Evidence-Based Policing. The new, potentially Royal, College of Policing in England and Wales has been mandated to develop and promote evidence of what works. All of this makes the lecture below incomplete, but not out of date. The basis ideas are as enduring as the Scottish Enlightenment from which they are drawn. It was an honour to bring them back to Scotland in this form.

Lawrence Sherman,
Cambridge
April, 2013

Evidence based policing: what we know and how we know it (October, 2009)

When we look back at terrible events, there are two key analytical questions that have to be raised. One is the extent to which the tragedy is predictable, foreseeable in advance; and the second is, even if it was predictable, was it preventable? Do we know how to prevent a tragedy of that kind? These questions hit particularly close to my family when our 1819 house in Cambridgeshire caught fire last week a few hours after we left for work. They have also been central to the UK police discussion about whether the tragic deaths of Louise Pilkington and her daughter, after she called Leicestershire Police on repeated occasions about anti-social behaviour.

In terms of prediction, I know in our own situation, we didn't have any of the risk factors that are associated with fires; other than the fact that it was an old house and was therefore had some old wiring in it. We also know that the risk of that fire was extremely low, and we therefore have to accept that there was no way of saying 'you are going to have a fire in that house'. But even with a low risk, there is still a very high uncertainty about whether or not something bad is going to happen. If you look at it from the perspective of Leicestershire Constabulary, at the point of the first phone call by Ms Pilkington to the police and the thirtieth call seven years later, you may find that you are in the denominator pool that is so big that the odds of a tragedy occurring may have been almost as unlikely as the fire in our house. The question of how predictable or comprehensible something is when looking backwards from an evidentiary standpoint is completely irrelevant, because you don't have a basis for saying that of course, all those calls over that time period could result in the kind of tragedy we saw in Leicestershire.

Whether the fire in our house, or the Leicestershire tragedy, had been preventable raises a separate set of questions. What is the threshold of indicators or risk factors that would need to be met before you would kick into place a policy for action that's designed to prevent the tragedy? If I look at Anti-Social Behavioural Orders (ASBOs) or family orders as an evidence based criminologist, I would say that no-one has any idea of the effectiveness of those strategies, even if they had been used.

But, that doesn't help when there is necessity – for political or cultural reasons – to find somebody to blame. If that necessity arises, there is always somebody who can be blamed, no matter how fairly or unfairly. There is, for example, the Simmons family; now getting death threats and abuse [the local authority had previously taken out an injunction against Steven and Suzanne Simmons, whose children were alleged to be involved in the abuse; the injunction was not enforced]. Questions could be raised if that's an appropriate focus, or, as the government has chosen to do, to focus on the Leicestershire Constabulary. The Northern Ireland Policing Board has demanded and received an apology from their new Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, who was Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary at the time of the case.

The problem with the blame culture of course, is that blame assumes both the predictability and the preventability of the event. It also narrows the research question to a single case out of a huge denominator of cases, where in 99% of cases the same denominator occurred but nothing terrible happened. Asking 'who's to blame?' rather than 'why did it happen?' doesn't allow us to ask how to prevent such harm in the future and learn how to change systems.

But, if we look forward, in the way that other fields have done, I think we can be encouraged by success stories from evidence based improvement. One major example is practices in the airline industry, where over the last 30 years there has been a huge reduction in the deaths from commercial jet liner crashes per passenger miles flown. If you look at auto accident deaths, at least in England and Wales, they are now down at the level they were in 1924, despite huge increases in population driving, and driving miles. Fire deaths are down all over the US and Europe, as far as I have been able to determine, and for me going forward, I think we've simply decided that we're going to rewire the house.

So what kind of evidence are we talking about? What we are interested in is systematic and helpful evidence about how we can get better results if systems are changed in certain ways. That's why in 1998 I presented to the Police Foundation in Washington DC a lecture on evidence based policing – and failed to copyright the term or trademark it, so that every time somebody says 'what's the evidence base for policing?' we could keep track of it (www.policefoundation.org/content/evidence-based-policing).

We have many different conceptions of what evidence based policing (EBP) is about. Even I keep changing my mind, so I thank you for this invitation, which helped me clarify what I think it really adds up to. EBP is a decision-making process that uses reliable, unbiased quantitative evidence on prediction and prevention as a primary criterion for setting goals, choosing priorities, making policies, making decisions, managing compliance, assessing results, and improving policies. It's thinking about evidence as a dashboard for steering policy and guiding decisions, on a turn by turn basis; but it allows for U-turns, because there's nothing more useful than a U-turn once you have the information if you're going in the wrong direction. I'm appalled every time the press goes after a government for changing its mind on policy, if it's a decision based on good evidence that the policy isn't working. I think they should get medals when they do that, rather than knee-jerk criticism.

As I often describe it to our students, EBP is a 'DRIVER' process, that is:

- Diagnosis—local evidence on the problem
- Response—reviews of published evidence
- Implementation—local evidence
- Value-added—actual versus predicted
- Evaluation—is this the best we can do?
- Revision—start all over again

It begins with the diagnosis; at local levels, from patterns and trends in what's going on within a police agency, and then relating those findings to the initiatives that have been rigorously evaluated and published in the literature, or even unpublished literature such as systematic reviews. Implementation of the policy again relies on local evidence, which could then help to understand whether the policy is adding value; recalling, as the press so often forgets, that the fundamental cause of a crime or disorder problem is not inadequate policing, but social conditions. All of this can then be evaluated as to whether we're implementing the policy well enough; if we have the right

policy match for the local diagnosis, and is there any way in which we ought to revise the policy, gather more evidence, and start the process again? It's inspired by what Dr W. Edwards Deming (who established the concept of quality control) called the 'continuous quality improvement circle' ('Plan, Do, Study, and Act').

Figure 1: Evidence based policing (Sherman, 1998).

This is the circle which I laid out in 1998, in which you take your **in house** evidence on what's going on in the agency; and then you go to the **literature**, what's known about the problem and how best to deal with it; this helps to develop internal or national policy **guidelines**; how you act and the **outcomes** to be accomplished in certain conditions.

Should certain things have been done in Leicestershire that weren't? As far as I can tell, no national policy was violated, no local or national guidance was ignored; the police were doing things that were within the range of acceptable conduct. They could have done more perhaps, if you look at it under a microscope, but that could be said about many things in hindsight. The larger question of **outcomes** then, relates not to any particular case but to an overall pattern. If you are getting better results using the policy than if you were to try something else, how would you know unless you— or someone else before you-- had actually tested your hypothesis?

All of that brings us to evidence-based medicine (EBM), which was the most direct model for Evidence-based policing, only six years after EBM as a movement began in Canada and England in 1992, especially under the leadership of the enterprising Scot obstetrician, Sir Iain Chalmers. He was the guiding force for creating the Cochrane Collaboration, which is devoted to taking the mass of medical research and systematically integrating it for practitioners. In medicine today, practitioners can increasingly go to a computer, put in a diagnosis, and get back the best evidence on how to deal with that problem. EBM has revolutionised medical practice, not just in the UK, but around the world, where there are now some 70 countries participating in the integration of medical practice evidence. This evidence is made available to patients, not only medical practitioners, so that everybody concerned with achieving the best possible outcome of a particular case has the best evidence on how to make it happen.

EBM is vitally important, even if some doctors don't want to do it. Many doctors would still rather practice 'experienced based' medicine, relying on clinical wisdom and anecdotal experience rather than systematic analysis. That is how such dangerous medical practices as blood-letting were practiced for centuries. When that practice was first tested in Paris in the 1830s, many doctors were furious about it. They said that it would take away the 'art' of medicine, which was the key to its success, by stressing mere technicalities. Of course, the findings showed that people were more likely to die from having their blood removed and less likely to die without it, but it still took decades to put a stop to that practice.

Sir Iain Chalmers has said: 'in medicine, the problem with not having an evidence base is that when we intervene in the lives of other people, we not infrequently end up doing more harm than good'. If we were to think in terms of a Hall of Shame, and non-evidence-based medicine, we have to go to the American Dr. Benjamin Spock, the paediatrician who may have indirectly "killed" a lot of babies. He used untested theories in giving advice to parents on the critical issue of how you put your baby to sleep: on its back, or on its stomach, or on its side? He was very clear about putting a baby to sleep on its stomach, for purely theoretical reasons. This was from his unsystematic experience, his personal biased sample, rather than a systematic test of hypothesis. He did not do what was needed in order to interpret cause and effect about what he thought he knew. He ignored the empirical revolution promoted by the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (1711 – 1776), who advised us to be more sceptical about what we think we know, and how we think we know it, and don't even begin to think we have the information necessary to infer causation from personal experience alone.

In the 1980s, the direct opposite of Spock's theory was tested: that babies would be better off sleeping on their back. Using not a randomised trial but quasi-experimental evaluation over a fifteen year period of advising parents to put babies on their "back to sleep," the death rate from cot death or sudden infant death syndrome dropped substantially. That evidence strongly suggested that Dr. Spock was wrong. But it was not the kind of evidence that is valued the most.

The problem with looking at trends and inferring causation is the logical fallacy of inferring that 'after this' therefore means 'because of this'. We have seen it in our own research into restorative justice in Canberra from 1995 to 2000, where there is a very impressive 29% drop in crime for those cases that participated in restorative justice for crimes of violence. But of course, if the cases of similar characteristics that were dealt with without restorative justice had dropped by 50%, the conclusion would have been wring despite a declining trend. Simply looking at a trend without a comparison leaves you still in the dark about what effect the intervention has had. In fact it looks like this (see Figure 2), with the dotted line being the randomly assigned control group, getting even worse over the two years after the random assignment. What we're seeing is actually a bigger effect than we thought just by looking at the trend in relation to the implemented programme.

Figure 2: Restorative justice for a sample of violent offenders in Canberra from 1995 to 2000; comparison of crime levels amongst of those participating in restorative justice (solid line) and the randomly assigned control group (dotted line).

The problem is that we can't distinguish a trend after programme implementation from what would have happened anyway--the natural trend or historical pattern. That's one example of what is meant by the term "spurious" explanations: plausible theories that can be explained away by other factors.

The point about using controls, or best of all, randomised controlled trials (RCTs), is that you can rule out explanations you haven't even thought of. No matter what was going on at the same time as the trend in the experimental group changed, it was also going on with the control group as well. That is why the impact is not found in the trend of one group, but in the *difference* between the trends of two groups. That is what made the pioneering development of RCTs in the UK – a British invention pioneered in 1948 by Sir Austin Bradford Hill – the gold standard for what works, with over a million trials in medicine being completed since Hill's. It is widely agreed in medicine that other research designs are more prone to bias and spurious explanations.

In the EBP literature, I have tried to make a strong case to ignore non-randomised testing to the degree possible and to prefer RCTs. For predictions, RCTs are not relevant, because predictions can be reliable without understanding causation. Even, then, however, standards matter. While the in-house data is necessarily descriptive and about patterns and trends, it can be used in a very precise way in terms of prediction; where are events most likely to occur, involving whom, what time of day, etc.

Let me offer three examples of the possible application of EBP. Firstly, in the case of murder, where it hasn't yet been used in policing, but has been used in probation. Secondly, the now 20-year history of concentrated police patrols in hot spots has spread widely across the US. Thirdly, EBP has been half-successful in the complicated history of the police responses to common assault in a domestic environment.

Example 1: Murder

In terms of murder, evidence-based predictions can greatly improve on experience-based predictions. I don't know if Scotland has the Multi-Agency Prevention Partnership Agreements (MAPPAs) which are widely used in England and Wales. I would suspect that if you do, it would be based on clinical prediction; that is, subjective assessment of who is dangerous by looking at their criminal records, as opposed to statistical forecasting, using tens of thousands of cases using data mining and non-linear analysis of the patterns of development which are precursors for extremely rare events. These are the needles in the haystack that statistical forecasting can identify in ways that no individuals can, because no individual is ever going to have 30,000 cases to deal with in the course of their career. No one person can absorb the full information that can be gleaned in an actuarial analysis using supercomputers that have only become available in this century.

The other problem with clinical prediction as it is currently used in multi agency prevention partnerships is that it doesn't take false negatives systematically into account. The failure to identify that somebody is dangerous before they kill somebody is rarely used to hold clinical prediction accountable for its errors. People left off the "danger" list are not placed under surveillance, nor under review.

A more cost-effective way to approach the prevention of murder or other extreme harm is laid out in an article by Richard Berk and I and our colleagues in 2009: 'Forecasting murder within a population of probationers and parolees: a high stakes application of statistical learning', published in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society.
(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-985X.2008.00556.x/abstract).

We looked at Philadelphia probation cases over an extended period of time in a city which has 300–400 murders per year in a population of 1.5 million people. So what we could say to a nation, such as Scotland, with six million people and around 110 murders a year? We have the data to do things that would take you a lot longer to do; and perhaps there are some insights from having a much higher murder rate.

One insight is the incredible importance of age as the most powerful predictor affecting the risk of committing murder, and the enormous fall from the age of 18 to 40. However, a hidden factor is the age at first adult disposition; if the age of first prosecution as an adult was 12, then that individual will not age out of the risk, so even as a 40 or 50 year old person they have the highest risk of committing murder of any age. Because they were 12 years old when first charged with armed robbery. And that is not something that is being looked at clinically; nor is it the entire story.

If you look at the article's analysis of some 17 risk factors in terms of how much error would be added to the forecasting by false negatives and false positives if it was not known if they were a factor, you can see that age is almost twice as important as the next factor, age of first contact; having a 'gun prior' is the third most important predictor of error, and fourth is being male, which is low compared to what we would normally think in terms of its power as predictor.

	Actually Happens	Actually does NOT Happen
Predicted to Happen	1. True Positive	2. False Positive
Predicted NOT to Happen	3. False Negative	4. True Negative

Figure 2: False negatives and false positives.

The most important point is that you cannot reduce this forecasting evidence to a check list; the personal history of each offender has to be in effect "dropped down" the statistical model every time a particular criminal history pattern goes into it, so you come up with a forecast that would take into account both the likelihood of a false positive, where you are predicting that somebody is likely to commit a murder, and then they don't; as well as a false negative where you predict that they won't commit a murder, but they do (See Figure 2).

High Risk (2%)

Neither High nor Low Risk (38%)

Low Risk (60%)

Figure 3: Philadelphia probation population (40,000) over a two year period: 2% at high risk of committing a murder; 60% at low risk, and 38% neither at high risk or low risk.

That is the basis for what turned out to be a very interesting pyramid prepared by Dr. Geoffrey Barnes among the probation population of some 40,000 people in Philadelphia, which is that 2% of them, looking forward over a two year period, were in fact at high risk of committing a murder; 60% were at low risk of committing a murder and the rest were in between. In terms of forecasting murder, the model identified people who were charged with murder or attempted murder 75 times more often than the lowest risk group. Now, that's still based on a high error rate; it's not perfect, it's not certain, it's not guaranteed and it's not something you'd necessarily want to put someone in prison for, which is what a lot of people say, when they look at this. The judiciary in Philadelphia is quite keen to get this kind of report before every case. The new District Attorney wants to use this as a basis for deciding who to divert from prosecution altogether, because he is committed to lowering the incarceration rate and this gives him some basis on which to do that, without putting

the public at greater risk. This raises ethical issues, but I would argue that those issues are already present even without these data. Judges and others are making the same kind of assessments on a case by case basis, by using clinical, biased and indeed racially prejudiced tools rather than rational tools and statistical analysis. Why, then, would it be less ethical to use unbiased forecasts?

In probation, offenders are already sentenced and under community supervision. The questions which we answered in this article were about managing sentenced offenders. If you wanted to direct more resources to people who were extremely dangerous, how would you pick them? And then, once you know that, how could you restructure your probation agents or officers? Using our answers, Philadelphia Probation officials have essentially put most of its offenders on low intensity supervisions – two visits a year to the probation office for the low risk group. This strategy was tested in an RCT showing that it makes no difference compared to six or 12 visits a year, which weren't being delivered anyway. So it turns out that compared to the best they can deliver in frequency of contact, with a case load of what was about 175 offenders per probation officer, there was no harm in lowering the intensity of visits in the lowest group. We're about to launch cognitive behavioural therapy and other interventions for the very small number of high risk cases, to see if it will reduce serious crime for people who have already been sentenced to community supervision. But the trade-off is a degree of uncertainty and imperfection; we had somebody, for example, who was classified as low risk who was charged with a murder this past summer. His supervision wouldn't have been substantially different had he been high-risk, but it fed the probation officer union opposition to risk-based classification.

Example 2: Hot spots

Used by police around the US, hot spots were originally understood to be very small micro locations, about the size of this lecture hall, with high concentrations of crime and disorder. These concentrations provided a means of prediction that could be a guide to efficient prevention. Just to return to this theme of prediction and prevention, we have seen that prediction is key to prevention not only in terms of setting goals, but setting priorities with efficiency; focusing the resources on high risk rather than on low risk targets and the peaks and valleys of crime probability.

Figure 4: Peaks and Valleys of Crime (Distribution of Violent Offenses in Tokyo)

The Japanese National Police Agency has brilliantly portrayed this in a density map of time and space which shows the probability of violent crime per square foot in Tokyo. It shows "volcanoes" of crimes, most of which are actually locations of pedestrian concentration. That is an explanation, but not a refutation, in the sense that if that's where the people are, if that's where the minor crimes are, then arguably that's where the police should be. An American police leader named Orlando W Wilson, in his 1950 book *Police Administration*, said that police should patrol throughout the entire jurisdiction in order to create the appearance of "omnipresence" as an effective deterrent. But that was merely theory-based policing. What we know from random assignment from over a hundred hot spots in Minneapolis is that when half of the hot spots got an average of two hours extra policing a day the result was a long term trend of crime reduction in the overall crime rate in the city, almost entirely due to reduction in the hot spots.

What David Weisburd and his colleagues found in Seattle is that crime rates change primarily in the small portion of a city where hot spots are located. About half of all crime in Seattle occurred in the 15% of blocks which are the most active crime locations in the city. As their article 'Crime Trajectories at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the City of Seattle' (Criminology 2004: 42: 283–322), almost all of the decrease in crime over 15 years occurred in those locations. If police concentrate on these volcanoes, the displacement argument is that if you squash it down here it's going to pop up over here. Yet almost every time we've actually tested that argument, in Professor David Weisburd's (Distinguished Professor of Criminology, Law and Society and Director of the Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy at George Mason University, Virginia, USA) work and in other people's work, we fail to find substantial evidence. There are some scattered indications, but the evidence is clearly against displacement in a nearby time and place. What we see here is the encouraging idea of focusing on hot spots, which in this case the Seattle police did not specifically do, but over that time period there was a revolution in information systems, with improved crime analysis directing police patrols.

But it's still not good enough, and that's why the Greater Manchester Police have now joined with Cambridge University in the Tactical Experiments and Strategic Testing (TEST) programme, which will extend the US hotspots patrol experiments into the UK in identified Manchester hot spots. The Minneapolis data was based on observing – with a stop watch – the number of minutes the police were standing or patrolling in each hot spot; both in the control group and in the experimental group. They found that the optimal control time in a hot spot is about 10 to 15 minutes, measured by the number of minutes after the police leave to the time the first crime occurs; or, how long does it take before the first criminal sticks his head up over the parapet and says 'I think the cops are gone, bang, give me your purse!' or something to that effect.


Figure 5: Effects on Crime and Disorder Maximized by 14-15 Minute Stops: the Koper curve (Koper C, 'Just enough police presence: reducing crime and disorderly behavior by optimizing patrol time in crime hotspots', *Justice Quarterly* 1995: 12: 649-672).

This is what the Koper curve looks like; it's logged in relation to some 5000 observations of police presence in hot spots; when the police arrive, when they leave, and the occurrence of crime is recorded by the observers. (That was an expensive approach, but such measurement can now be done cheaply by GPS locators in police cars and radios.) In Minneapolis, in a context of generally rising crime, there was a substantially lower rate of increase in the extra patrol hotspots, using calls to the police as the indicator. For soft crime, there was not as great an effect as for hard crime, including robberies, assaults and other predatory crimes, which were reduced by extra patrol despite the overall rise in the crime rate. In the control areas, the hard crimes remained constant.

The research designed in Greater Manchester Police (GMP) would take advantage of the size of that agency, where we can identify 200 hot spots that are small enough so that one police car can be seen from anywhere in that hot spot. The hot spot must be far is enough from others to be independent so they are not confused in the causal analysis. It is also good to add a displacement cushion around the measured hot spots, with 100 of them receiving two hours' extra constables' patrol daily; the other 100 receiving no extra policing; and then compare the crime trends before and after the experiment took place.

Studies can measure police presence all over the city of Manchester using the automatic radio locator system which is just coming online and should be fully operational within a year. Analysts can also look at arrests made at each hot spot and then the quality of observations. We're certainly very concerned, at a time when police have made complaints have reached record levels in England and Wales, that hot spot policing be non provocative, and not generate more complaints than the control group. The key question is the distinction between a proactive presence without a proactive intervention, which is certainly something that has come up in relation to the G20 protests in London.

The final point here is that every other agency in the UK – and indeed in the world – is invited to join in. I will come back to the idea of multi-site experiments, because in general it advances the evidence rather than doing single experiments. In this GMP model we should have both incidents and crime reports, and with any luck we'll be able to take some measures of police–community interactions.

All of this came out of our graduate approach at the University of Cambridge, in which students in the Diploma course just this year – Chief Superintendents and Superintendents for the most part – have taken the evidence-based policing idea to heart and used it to persuade their chief officers and the Jerry Lee Centre of Experimental Criminology to support not only a hot spots experiment but several other experiments as well. We can here cite Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) who said: 'Universities [help] create the future' – with a little more modesty, by adding the word 'help'. For these officers to come to Cambridge and talk about what works in policing, if nothing else has led to them thinking about policing in a different way. If we can have our graduates lean on evidence, not just from Manchester but from elsewhere, that would be a measure of accomplishment of the programme.

Example 3: Domestic common assault

Our third example of evidence-based policing is common domestic assault. Under the leadership of Marcus Beale, the Acting Deputy Chief Constable and permanent Assistant Chief Constable in Staffordshire, we have designed an experiment that could test police discretion against a mandatory arrest policy. Mr. Beale came back to Cambridge last year to finish his Masters degree, and for his dissertation he analysed several hundred arrest-eligible cases for common domestic assault in one basic command unit (BCU) in Staffordshire. He found a clear pattern of officers often doing something different from what the national policy would require – presumptive arrest. Instead, many of them were consulting victims and asking the victims what they think would be the most effective police action to make victims safe. Do they want the arrest, do they not want the arrest, do they want the fellow to go to his mother's, or to his brother's? Not in 100% of the cases, but in a very large proportion, there's evidence that even when the arrest was being made, it was being made in conjunction with a victim consultation.

There can be lots of arguments about this. I think we can say from American experiments in domestic violence is that victim preference as a policy has simply never been tested; we have no idea if a victim consultation approach does better than a mandatory arrest policy. Beale's dissertation raised the question of conducting a randomised trial comparing victim consultation to the mandatory arrest policy to see which one has a lower level of frequency or seriousness of recidivism.

Some of you may know that that proposal builds on a 30 year history of research, in which the first randomised trials for any offence and also for domestic violence took place in Minneapolis in 1980–84. Overall in that first test, arrest reduced repeat offending in the next six months by about half; but research since then found more complex results (Lawrence Sherman, Policing Domestic Violence. New York: Free Press, 1992).

What the overall body of research evidence has not had is much influence on policy. The most influential result was the initial finding that everybody welcomed, and which was published in *The Times*: that arrest works, cracking down works, getting tough works. In those 300 Minneapolis cases randomly assigning arrest, advising or ordering the offender off the premises for 24 hours; arrest had a 10% recidivism rate compared to 24% for sending the suspect away and 19% for police advice.

What you should say about something like this is 'very interesting' and repeat the experiment; that is, what you would say if you have a scientific temperament. Science needs replication; we need to know if the same results can be found repeatedly, and in the case of 'arrest works best', that is not what we found in five further tests of arrest from domestic violence. But, we did find something else that was consistent across the three tests, and that is – not what people wanted to hear – but that the effect of arrest depends on the employment of the suspect and the *employment* level in the neighbourhood. This meant that arrest helps deter employed men, but it makes unemployed men more violent; in areas of low unemployment arrest has a deterrent effect, but in areas of high unemployment it has a criminogenic effect.

Figure 6: Miami: Percentage of offenders with repeat domestic violence

Figure 6 summarises the findings in Miami; limited to married couples, primarily Hispanic recent immigrants; when they were unemployed, it doubled their risk of repeat arrests for domestic violence in the next six months; when employed it halved that risk. The same patterns were found in the frequency of repeat violence in Milwaukee in a predominantly African American population; and in Omaha in a predominantly White working class population. So, three different ethnic groups, three different parts of the country, very different ways in which police were called – neighbours called police, family members called police. We got a highly consistent finding, with the effect also dependent upon neighbourhood and working worst in areas of concentrated poverty; where most calls to police about domestic violence come from.

The evidence raises a very difficult question about the common assault or domestic violence policy in England, which states: 'the perpetrator shall be arrested immediately, if available. Failure to do so may amount to a neglect of duty and the reasons for not doing so must be clearly documented' (The Metropolitan Police, Policy Statement, 2004; restated in September 2012: http://www.met. police.uk/foi/pdfs/policies/domestic_violence_policy.pdf)

One thing we do know from randomised trials is that presumptive arrest in many cases can cause more violence than if there's no arrest; but we can't then say that doing nothing is acceptable. The question of what to do next, especially in a country with a nationalised policy, would be answered by the Staffordshire Domestic Violence Experiment, which might be joined by the Manchester police. We invite everybody in this room to consider if they would like to participate in this multi-site, or Randomized Experiment Network (RExNet) comparison, under a government dispensation from the mandatory arrest policy, the victim consultation process, defined as: discussing all the options with the victim, helping the victim advise police on what might work best to stop the violence in both the short and long run, including arrest; and the police then follow that advice. The trial protocol involves volunteer officers, who declare the case eligible, call the University of Cambridge, the case records go into the computer, which then randomly assigns using a mathematical equal probability process to determine if the case should be victim consultation or follow Home Office policy.

What would be the result? We can't know unless the experiment is conducted. We propose to call it the WISDOM experiment. We've tried deterrence. Now we might try wisdom, and see if the **W**omen's **I**nvitation to **S**upport **D**omestic **O**ffender **M**anagement works. This, incidentally is consistent with recent advocacy writing by people like Linda Mills (Professor of Social Work, New York University School of Law), who is herself a student of domestic violence and a victim of it. The hypothesis is essentially that there would be less harm in the aftermath of a police response guided by consultation with the victim, in comparison to the presumption of arrest, both when the offenders are present and when they are not.

To conclude, it is increasingly possible to pursue what works best in policing. Relentless pursuit of the best evidence from published research can be linked to in-house data to enhance the outcomes that policing can produce. What we know from evidence based policing is that some high risk crime is predictable. Using policies around predictions can, on average, get better results than not using those policies, at least when you subject the policies to systematic tests. As a framework for going forward, using knowledge to improve the effectiveness of policing has the best prospects. We would achieve far less by shutting out the provable facts and going with theories or with the latest political government of the day. With evidence-based policing, what we are doing is what David Hume asked us to do almost 300 years ago in Edinburgh: to distrust our purely personal experiences, and seek instead a more objective basis for our knowledge.

Thank you.

Discipline and Discretion:
The role of discipline and discretion in delivering an improvement agenda[5]

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Biography

Nick Tilley is Professor at the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science at UCL and Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Nottingham Trent University. He has carried out considerable work in the UK, and between 1991 and 2003 was seconded to the Home Office research department, developing problem-oriented policing approaches. The Home Office set up the 'Tilley Award' in 1999 to encourage and recognise best practice in tackling crime and anti-social behaviour using problem oriented-principles in the long term, working with local agencies to tackle the root causes of problems. Professor Tilley's research interests lie in policing, crime prevention and programme evaluation methodology, and he is author or editor of 10 books and around 150 chapters, journal articles and published research reports. He was awarded an OBE for services to Policing and Crime Reduction in 2005 and elected to the Academy of the Social Sciences in 2009.

Foreword

Giving public lectures in an unnerving experience. In this case, it was especially so. I delivered my SIPR Annual Lecture in 2010 and was following very distinguished predecessors, who I admire and whose work leaves me, for the most part, in awe. Moreover my audience was made up of smart, thoughtful and informed practitioners, policy-makers and researchers. In my lecture, I was trying to work through some tentative ideas on policing improvement, which had their origins in observations of parallel efforts to foster better, evidence-based healthcare in the United States. I was grateful for the opportunity to present my arguments and for the attention of those addressed. It was a privilege to talk about research for policing improvement to a group so clearly committed to it.

Professor Nick Tilley
March 2013

[5] Held at the Court Senate Suite, University of Strathclyde, 30 September 2010

The origins of this lecture lie in Vermont. I was there in the Summer of 2009 at a meeting of nurses, physicians and pharmacists who were part of a burgeoning and, to my mind, impressive movement for healthcare improvement in the United States (Kenney 2008). My role was as one of two 'wizards' to provide an outsider's input into their discussions at the end of each day's deliberations. Ray Pawson and I had been invited because of our work on evaluation methodology (Pawson & Tilley 1997; Pawson 2006; Tilley 2010), which proposes an alternative to the standard experimental and quasi-experimental methods. Those who invited us were interested in evidence-based methods of improving healthcare and they too had found some standard research methods unworkable. They were attracted to the ideas we had for practical methods of building an evidence-based to improve policy and practice. I'll come back to that at the end of the lecture.

For the moment, let me describe the issue that cropped up one day. It related to hand-washing. Even since the work of Ignaz Semmelweis, a Hungarian doctor working in a maternity unit in a Viennese hospital in the mid nineteenth century, hand-hygiene has been a major issue in health care. Semmelweis worked out that the high rates of death from childbed fever in the ward ran by physicians at the hospital was a function of the inadequate ways in which they washed their hands following the autopsies they conducted in the mortuary, which was adjacent to the maternity ward (Semmelweis 1983, originally 1861). They washed their hands, but the difficulty in getting rid of residues from the bodies they examined was evident from the lingering smell. The rate of death from childbed fever was much higher in their ward than the one run by midwives, who did not conduct autopsies, and had been so for several years. Semmelweis initiated a programme of hand-washing in a strong solution of chlorinated lime and the differences in death rates between the two wards disappeared.

There was enormous resistance to Semmelweis's findings. It was difficult for doctors to come to terms with the possibility that they had been inadvertently killing their patients. But history has vindicated Semmelweis and hand-washing failures are now widely recognised as important causes of infections. Notwithstanding this, getting hands washed well continues to be a challenge and healthcare improvements still include efforts to achieve more and better hand-washing.

The issue that arose in Vermont was whether it was ever right to break the injunction to wash hands before touching a patient. One view was that the precept was absolute. Under no circumstances should a patient be touched without prior hand-washing – it was non-discretionary. Another view was that although hand-washing was generally to be undertaken, there were circumstances in which it would be inappropriate. Those favouring unconditional rules highlighted the risks of failure to wash hands and the dangers of allowing discretion to practitioners. If hand-washing were to be open to judgement-according-to-the-situation then it would cease to be routine, would tend to lapse, and the consequence would be a significant increase in the rate practitioner-patient infections. Those favouring a less-than-absolute rule could envisage particular situations in which adherence to the rule would not be in the patient's best interest. We were asked to imagine a situation in which a main artery was severed, where the practitioner present had not washed their hands before the accident but where their prompt action could stem the

bleeding. The patient's chances of survival would be improved by disregarding the injunction always to wash hands before providing treatment.

There is no doubt about the desirability of hand-washing. There is no lack of interest in working out ways of increasing the rate of hand-washing and of reducing the frequency of lapses in adequate hand hygiene. The question posed was that of whether the aim should be unconditionally to require hand washing always before any contact with a patient.

The Vermont discussion then turned to discretion in medicine and public health more generally. When should behaviours be invariant? When should they be discretionary? How can desirable invariant behaviours be produced? How can good judgement, in circumstances where discretion is needed, best be inculcated? And how could a research agenda help answer these questions? These are all key issues in improving health care.

Given that my day job relates to research on policing, crime prevention and research methodology, unsurprisingly this led me to wonder about the equivalent questions in my field. The invitation to give this lecture came as I was pondering these issues and, perhaps rashly, I decided that it would force me to structure some ideas to share with you and elicit your own thinking.

I should stress at the start that although discretion comprises an interesting intellectual puzzle and poses a series of important practical questions for policy-makers and practitioners, I'm not at all sure that it is seen as a problem for policing. It may well be that the pattern of rule bound and discretionary action that marks contemporary policing is deemed about right or, if it is not right, there's little that can be done about it to improve matters. One of my starting points is curiosity: How much discretion is there? How is it exercised? And how is it circumscribed? The other is that of good practice: What should be discretionary? In what ways can discretion be improved? What should be mandatory? How can mandatory behaviour be produced? Only having answered these questions in relation to specific practices does it become possible to ask whether there are shortcomings now or whether improvements could be made? My starting point, however, is that policing would do well to embrace the kind of improvement agenda that is at work in health and that if it does so any change will need to consider issues of discretion.

Much that has been written about discretion in policing comes from the United States. Rather less has come from this side of the Atlantic. In the US until around 1960 it was assumed that the police exercised little discretion. If they saw or heard of an allegation that a criminal law had been broken, they would investigate. If a crime had been committed and the perpetrator was identified they would arrest and charge the person involved. This was referred to as 'full enforcement'. As Joseph Goldstein (1960) put it:

> *Within the area of full enforcement, the police have not been delegated discretion not to invoke the criminal process. (P)olice are… charged with the enforcement of laws; success in police administration is directly related to completeness and perfection in the performance of this task.*

Less than full enforcement, that is enforcement with police discretion, was deemed dangerous. Corruption was one possibility where scope for non-enforcement opens the doors for police to be prevailed upon to disregard some criminal offence because of the rewards that are offered. Abuse is also risked where a blind eye is turned to one form of criminal behaviour in return for co-operation in helping to secure the information on the behaviour of others. The police officers should be blind in their application of the law, showing no fear or favour; once discretion is introduced blind justice is sacrificed. Once blind justice is sacrificed, confidence in the rule of law is jeopardised.

Whatever the theoretical merits of full enforcement, in practice it was soon recognised that it is a non-starter. As Joseph Goldstein (1960) again put it:

> *Limitations of time, personnel, and investigative devices, all in part but not entirely functions of budget, force the development, by plan or default, of priorities of enforcement. Even if there were "enough police" adequately equipped and trained, pressures from within and without the department, which is after all a human institution, may force the police to invoke the criminal process selectively.*

Discretion, according to this view and of many others (for example Herman Goldstein 1963, 1967, 1977, 1990 and George Kelling 1999), inescapably characterises policing and operates at a number of levels. Ultimately the individual officer cannot robotically enforce the law. If they tried to do so they would be paralysed. Too much time would be spent on too few cases if the police officer were always to go for full enforcement in relation to each instance of law breaking s/he saw or heard about. On a larger scale it is not conceivable that there would ever be sufficient resources for full enforcement to be a practical possibility. Discretion is built in.

Moreover, it is doubtful if anyone would ever seriously advocate full enforcement. What's treated as crime is often a matter of context, and this is, I guess, almost universally accepted when it comes to practice. The line between normal behaviour and 'proper crime', for example, can be a thin one and decisions not to crime what could strictly be classed as a 'crime' is unavoidably a routine matter in some contexts. For example, in England and Wales almost a quarter of 10 to 12 year old boys (23.1%) technically suffered assaults in 2008-9, but fewer that one in 15 believed themselves to have been victims, because many of the incidents involved the kinds of sibling and playground scraps that are widely taken to be a normal part of childhood (Millard and Flatley 2010). Few would expect any sensible police officer as a matter of course to treat these sometimes serious crimes as matters calling for the arrest and prosecution of the perpetrators. If full enforcement were to be tried the criminal justice system would not only grind to a halt, it would also look ridiculous. Furthermore, policing is a complex social institution, with multiple aims not all of which have to do with enforcement (Goldstein 1977, 1990).

The diverse aims of policing, which include such matters as keeping traffic moving, returning missing children to their parents and guardians, dealing with neighbour complaints of noisy parties, protecting the rights of demonstrators whilst preventing them from running riot, and persuading rowdy youth to be more considerate or those intimidated by them to be more tolerant, further reduce the resources available for full enforcement. Some police aims may also be in conflict with full enforcement. In particular order maintenance may better be achieved by showing flexibility in law enforcement than by engaging in it fully at every opportunity. This is not just because full enforcement would take the officer away from the streets, whilst they dealt with those arrested. It is also because of the provocation that such a response would sometimes cause.

In the light of the real conditions of their work, police officers have been described as 'street level bureaucrats.' Michael Lipsky says of these that:

> Unlike lower-level workers in most organisations, (they) have considerable discretion in determining the nature, amount, and quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies. Policemen decide who to arrest and whose behaviour to overlook. (Lipsky 1980: 13).

Notwithstanding the inexorability of discretion, there are easily recognised and frequently noted risks in its exercise. As Joseph Goldstein recognises corruption is clearly a danger. Police officers may be persuaded to exercise discretion in ways that favour friends, high status people, those belonging to the same ethnic group or those who are prepared to pay bribes. Likewise they may use discretion to persecute those who they dislike, those belonging to different ethnic groups, lower class people, or those whose definition as criminals brings advantages to third parties who are prepared to bribe officers. Sometimes, discretion may be abused in the furtherance of what are deemed important public service goals: planting evidence and the use of violence or threats to elicit confessions are examples. Lipsky even suggests that this type of behaviour may go on with the collusion of supervisors, who 'look the other way' (Ibid: 19).

Discretion may also have unwanted unintended consequences. If different people are seen to receive different treatment for ostensibly the same acts then a casualty may be loss of confidence in the criminal justice system and, possibly more seriously, a reluctance to co-operate with police officers (Crawford, 2009). The latter reluctance may spill over into violence, where the discretionary behaviour actually provokes crime. The problem for the officer is that decisions have sometimes to be made rapidly in the absence of complete information. Moreover, even if there were time and information aplenty predicting the effects of specific decisions is hazardous.

The poor police officer, then, has to exercise discretion, may be tempted to abuse it, may have superiors who are apt to turn a blind eye to it if it helps achieve their objectives, will often make their decisions in less than ideal circumstances and will rarely be able in full confidence to know what the upshot will be. And, if some unforeseen disaster follows, s/he risks being blamed for it. The wisdom of hindsight coupled with scapegoating bites hard.

Despite its problems, police officers for the most part seem to enjoy the discretion they have and see it as one of the rewards of the job. A recent study by Michael Rowe (2007) looked at how police officers in three English sub-divisions responded to efforts to remove their discretion in responding to incidents of domestic violence. The police have in the past been criticised for their use of discretion in dealing with domestic incidents, which are archetypal repeat crimes. The police had tended to deal informally with 'domestics', to try to calm the situation, and to avoid invoking the criminal justice system if this could be avoided. But this fails to acknowledge that an assault has taken place, that protection is needed and that calls to the police tend to be made only after a lot of unreported incidents. In the area where Rowe conducted his fieldwork, full enforcement was therefore brought in as the preferred response to these cases. The police officers acquiesced and followed the directive they had been given. Strictly they retained their discretion in principle, but the decision not to enforce brought trouble for them from their supervisors: they would have to justify and accept responsibility for the consequences if they decided to deviate from force policy. The officers were trained to make arrests and told that arrest was in the best interests of the victim even if that's not what they wanted. Some were persuaded that the new policy was the right one, but in a number of particular cases the arrest policy was followed less because it was deemed appropriate and more because of the consequences for the officer if they did not toe the line. In relation to one case of a very drunk couple, where the alleged perpetrator was asleep upstairs and the victim too drunk to make a statement, the clinching argument in favour of following the arrest policy made by one of the two officers attending was that:

> …if he commits further violence against her tonight then there will be serious repercussions. The positive arrest policy says we should take him in. It's a load of bollocks, but if we don't and someone else gets called back here tonight then we're going to have some explaining to do. I don't think it'll get anywhere, but what else can we do? (Rowe 2007: 286)

In another case Rowe refers to, the perpetrator had called to report the incident and the victim wanted her partner to be prescribed the medication he needed rather than that he be arrested and charged. She was worried that processing him would delay the treatment he needed. The officer responded by saying, 'We don't want to arrest him, but we have no choice as it is force policy.' (Rowe 2007: 290). He said, however, he'd check with the sergeant, whose advice was, 'You know the policy, arrest him' (ibid), and that's what the officer did.

It is clear that in particular cases officers believed that reduced discretion was leading them to respond inappropriately to some of the incidents to which they were sent. They saw flaws in the full enforcement policy even in relation to this particular incident type. In addition to the concerns about specific cases, they also had wider worries. In particular they feared that an automatic arrest policy might make victims more reluctant to call the police and be open to the kind of help they might provide.

Overall, the police officers Rowe observed were also unhappy at fetters on their discretion. It threatened their professionalism in that they were no longer able to make their own judgements based on their experience. They also felt it suggested that they no longer enjoyed the trust of their senior officers. They could no longer do the job as they saw fit. As one put it:

> It's ridiculous, years ago we were able to make a note in our pocketbook, give words of advice to people and send them on their way. The problem was resolved informally and every one was reasonably happy. Nowadays we have to complete a crime report, take a victim statement and witness statements, do all the paperwork and for what: no further action is taken and the outcome is the same as it would have been years ago, but it took five minutes in those days! (Rowe 2007: 291).

Officers' preferences for discretion do not mean, of course, that discretion is the best policy. I've already mentioned some downsides. The arguments by officers in its favour are clearly self-serving. The tendency for those at the centre to try to control those at the periphery and for those at the periphery to want to avoid control from the centre appears to be ubiquitous (Gouldner 1959, 1960).

In the case of domestic violence, critics of the police response have suggested that uninformed, intuitive discretion might have led to routine practices that do not on balance produce the best outcomes. Indeed it was this suspicion that led to the arrest policies in the force examined by Michael Rowe. That suspicion had also led to some major studies in the United States of different ways of responding to misdemeanour domestic violence. I want to say a little about them because they may help us gauge better the research agenda that may best provide evidence to improve policing policy and practice.

In the early 1980s in the US the kinds of concern that led to the initiative Rowe looked at was animating movements for mandatory arrest policies. In the US there is more research money than there is in this country and it was decided that an experiment should be undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the arrest policy in stemming repeat incidents. The first trial was undertaken in Minneapolis. Cases were randomly allocated to arrest or to other responses and rates of repeat incident were compared for each response to see whether the arrest response produced a lower rate of repeat incident than other treatments in the ensuing six months (Sherman & Berk 1984). Discretion was removed from the officers and they were told what to do in individual cases on a randomised basis. What mattered for this trial was that the measures were implemented as required case by case. The arrest response outperformed the other responses. Arrest seemed to work. Moreover it was possible to gauge by how much it worked – that is to estimate the effect size. Based on police records 10 per cent of those arrested committed repeat violence over the following six months compared to 19 per cent for those advised and 24 per cent for those where the suspect was simply sent away. Victim reports produced different detailed results but much the same picture with figures of 19 per cent, 37 per cent and 33 per cent respectively for repeat violence for arrest, advice and sending the suspected perpetrators away.

Partly on the basis of this finding mandatory arrest policies in relation to domestic violence became the norm in the United States. Later studies replicating the Minneapolis experiment, however, came out with different findings (Sherman 1992). Arrest did not outperform other responses; indeed it seemed sometimes to make matters worse. Even if the findings if the original Minneapolis-St Paul study were valid for that city, they could not safely be generalised: in other words they lacked what social researchers call 'external validity' even if they achieved 'internal validity'. The reason the first study necessarily lacked external validity is that the random allocation was (as it had to be) from a specific population. It could not be of all populations in all places at all times. Random allocations to varying treatments from different populations produced different outcome patterns. If we find that arrest has an effect but we cannot be certain in any community what the direction of the effect will be, we clearly have problems in lesson-learning!

This is itself an important lesson for police officers and researchers trying to build an evidence base for practice. I want, though, here to raise a further problem. The basis for the conclusion about the effectiveness or otherwise of the arrest policy in Minneapolis was based on comparing pre-ordained responses to incidents. The officers in the course of the trial were directed to the response they gave on a random basis. They not only had no choice but to arrest if that was the response to which they were allocated, they had no choice but to follow the other responses included in the studies. The comparison was of one mandated response against another. It was not of a standard, mandated response against discretion that might sometimes involve arrest but may also, case-by-case, involve other responses also. What it could inform was a mandated standard response not the exercise of informed discretion.

The post-hoc explanation for the variations in response to arrest in the different cities where trials were held was that where arrest tended to work, the communities were stable and employment levels were high. Arrest and its prospect tended to activate shame that reduced the probability that perpetrators would repeat. Where arrest tended not to work the communities were less stable and levels of unemployment were higher. Here arrest and its prospect tended less to activate shame and more to activate anger, which increased the probability that perpetrators would repeat.

These mechanisms do not exhaust the possibilities, as some of the comments of Rowe's subjects indicate, and as outlined in Table 1. Table 1 derives from some seminars where mandatory arrest was discussed. They comprise testable theories about how arrest policies may pan out for those in different circumstances because of the way they affect the decision-making, both by those who may act violently and those who may report violence against them.

Table 1. Domestic Violence Arrest Possibilities by context

Mechanism	Context	Data to text expected outcome pattern
1. Women's shame	Membership of 'respectable' knowing community	Reduced level of reporting of incidents amongst those with close attachments to communities valuing traditional family life
2. Women's fear of recrimination	History of violence; culturally supported violence; alcoholism of offender	Reduced levels of reporting incidents amongst chronically victimized
3. Women's fear of loss of partner	Emotional or financial dependency on partner	Reduced level of reporting amongst poorer and emotionally weaker women
4. Women's fear of children being taken into care	Pattern of general domestic violence against whole family	Reduced level of reporting amongst families known to social services
5. Women's empowerment	Availability of refuges; support for women; financial resources of women	Increased levels of separation where support and alternative living arrangements available
6. Incapacitation of offender	Length of time held	Short-term reductions in repeat incidents
7. Offender shame	Membership of 'respectable' knowing community	Reduced domestic violence within 'respectable' communities
8. Offender anger	Cultural acceptability of male violence to women; what man has to lose from brushes with the law	Increased levels of violence amongst those violence-sanctioning communities marginal to mainstream society
9. Offender shock	Offender attachment to partner; self-image as law-abiding respectable person	Reduced levels of violence, and help-seeking behaviour amongst short-tempered 'respectable' men
10. Changed norms about propriety of domestic violence	Positive publicity	Reduced levels of reported and unreported domestic violence

* These hypotheses clearly relate to domestic violence where a man is the perpetrator and a woman the victim
Source: Tilley (2000: 106)

The way Rowe's subjects talked about the cases they attended, where they would have preferred not to follow the arrest policies, indicated their sensitivity to the particularities of cases and the ways in which the same practice might produce different intended and unintended consequences according to the particular circumstances. The averaged findings for each of the cities where the trials of mandatory arrest may, of course, encompass some individual cases where the arrest response increased the risk of repeat incidents as well as others where it reduced it and still others

where there was no effect either way. The trials measure net effects where some positive and other negative effects may be cancelled out. Indeed any finding of 'no effects' may denote either no effects at all or a cancelling out of positive and negative effects, as Table 2 shows.

Table 2: Sample ways in which the same net effects can be produced

	Cases	Positive effect	Negative effect	No effect	Net effect
Small positive effect 1	100	30	20	70	10%
Small positive effect 2	100	55	45	0	10%
No effect 1	100	50	50	0	0%
No effect 2	100	0	0	100	0%
Small negative effect 1	100	20	30	70	-10%
Small negative effect 2	100	45	55	0	-10%
Large positive effect 1	100	50	0	50	50%
Large positive effect 2	100	75	25	0	50%
Large negative effect 1	100	0	50	50	-50%
Large negative effect 2	100	25	75	0	-50%

The variability in effects can, of course, be a function not only of differences in the cases, in terms of the reactions of those subject to the measures applied. They may also result from different ways in which the 'same' measure is delivered. Police officers do not all do the same thing in the same way. Inadequacies in implementation are well known and for most programmes, not just those involving the police.

Demonstration projects in particular tend to outperform successors that are rolled out after them because of the greater enthusiasm and dedication of those involved in the original initiative. Another well-documented example relating to a rather different approach to repeat domestic violence illustrates this. A project in Killingbeck, West Yorkshire, addressed repeat domestic violence through standardised increases in intensity and enforcement with successive incidents, including discretion that responses could always be ratcheted up earlier if the particular case suggested that this was needed. The process, however, could never be reversed. The default position was to scale up; there was no discretion to scale down. The Killingbeck project was deemed a success and it was decided to roll it out (Hanmer et al 1999). What was rolled out, however, was a pale reflection of the original. It lacked its dedicated leadership, energy and authority (Hanmer 2003). Non-discretionary scaling up was not consistently maintained. Jalna Hanmer, who was involved in studying both the original Killingbeck project and its rolling out, was aghast at the discretion to depart from the Killingbeck model that emerged. For her, clearly mandated responses defining the limits to discretion in accordance with the theory behind the Killingbeck project was crucial.

Conclusions for improving policing and research aimed at improving policing

I want now to draw the threads of the preceding discussion together tentatively to suggest an agenda for improving policing and for research on policing that aims to inform improvements in it.

Let us briefly indicate where we have got so far:
1. Police discretion is inevitable;
2. Unfettered police discretion is dangerous;
3. Closely prescribed police action is liable to produce predictable unintended harms;
4. Assessment methods have tended to focus on measuring the net effects of standardised police responses, rather than discretionary ones.

Points 2 and 3 tell us that rules and discretion can both produce poor policing. As Figure 1 indicates, unsurprisingly poor discretion and poor rules can create poor policing. Improvements could be created by either improving discretion or by improving rules. Indeed strongly prescribed rule-bound behaviour could lead to improvements in the face of either poor discretion or behaviour that is dictated by poor rules. Similarly, wise informed discretion could produce an improvement on both poor discretion and responses dictated by poor rules. If we go for wise and informed discretion, how is it best to be produced in police officers? If we go for rules, how are we best to determine what the rules should be and how do we best secure behaviour in accordance with them? If improvements in policing overall are to be achieved by having some behaviours that are discretionary and some that are mandatory, how do we decide which is which? Perhaps improvements could be effected by establishing routines for evidence-based normal best practice as a backcloth for the exercise of discretion where it is needed?

| Problem | Diagnosis | Improved strategy |

Figure 1: Discretion, discipline and improvement strategies

These seem to me to be fundamental questions for any police service bent on improvement and any research outfit intent on serving an improvement agenda. The answers will be particular to specific issues in policing and will require empirical research. I've focused on domestic violence in this lecture but would expect, mutatis mutandis, that somewhat similar issues would arise in any area. What we found is that dealing with domestic violence is complex and achieving sustained and consistent improvements in outcome by changed police practices is fraught with difficulties. In relation to better rules or better discretion as the better routes to improvement, the following general principles seem to me to be important starting points:

1. For some purposes rules have to be explicit and to be followed. Those relating to the collection, non-contamination, continuity in, storage of and analysis of physical evidence comprise significant examples. This is not to say that these are entirely mechanical matters. It is, however, to say that there are rather strict rules that have to be followed. Past failures in relation to the collection and use of physical evidence suggest that there is a substantial research agenda on how best to secure compliance (HMIC 2000, 2001; Tilley and Ford 1996).

2. For some purposes it seems likely that discretion will be important, for example in relation to methods of dealing with so-called 'wicked issues': those for which there is no existing, standard, tried and proven general response. Problem-oriented policing is mostly relevant to police-relevant community problems of this kind, which persist despite standard responses. In problem-oriented policing discretion is central, although the actions taken are not arbitrary but follow analysis and at best apply well-grounded theory. The research and practice agenda here has to do with the identification and analysis of historical and emerging problem patterns and the assessment of the success with which the tentatively applied theory is applied. The purpose of the improvement-orientated research here is in part to see whether the problem has been successfully addressed. It is also, however, to provide findings that enrich the knowledge-base of policy-makers and practitioners better to use their discretion in dealing with future problems. One of the reasons why crime problems, in particular, continuously evolve has to do with the adaptive behaviour of offenders (Ekblom 1997). They adjust their behaviour in relation to those trying to thwart them. They seek out new crime opportunities. They also make use of new tools for committing crime. In contrast to the body, which basically continues to function in the same way and only slowly and passively to adapt to treatment, in social life humans behave strategically. They can and do adapt actively and deliberately. The subject-matter of policing is in this sense more malleable than that of medicine and hence what was relevant and effective yesterday may cease to be so tomorrow. It is for this reason that informed, discretionary problem-solving policing has more need of tested general theory than is the case in physical medicine, where the body's reactions are more predictable, although even here variations in the ways in which different people respond to the same medication suggests a need for greater attention to diversity than may have been the case in the past. The newish field of pharmacogenetics is concerned with just this (Wolf et al 2008).

3.   Having stressed the need for discretion and for a knowledge-base of tested theory to inform its use, it has to be recognised that the police often have to act in conditions of substantial uncertainty. In busy circumstances rules of thumb are inevitably used. But there are better and worse rules of thumb. Identifying, testing and improving police officer rules of thumb as they deal with recurrent issues comprises an important part of an agenda for improving policing. The critics of police failures to take domestic violence incidents seriously by using as their rule of thumb that they were rubbish work not to be taken seriously, were almost certainly right. Understanding how rules of thumb are developed, what they should be, and how they can be changed where they are found wanting, are key research issues for improvement. Once decided, rather than trying to impose uniform behaviours, it might be more sensible to specify default responses, departures from which should be reported and explained, and to find ways of producing the default behaviour. Interestingly, although often the first ports of call, the strategy may not always be best achieved by education and enforcement. In the case of hand hygiene, for example, there was a consensus that hand-washing should be the default although failures are routine and responsible for many hospital-caused infections. One of the best examples of a method of improving the rate of default had-hygiene involved relocating hand-washing facilities. Putting them at the entrance to single wards, where the doctor checks the notes for the patient, evidently leads to a much higher levels of compliance to the preferred default hand-washing practices than putting them at patient's bed-head, where the doctor has to walk by the patient to wash his or her hands in the event that they decide that some kind of physical examination is needed. (I owe this example to Kathy Kirkland of Dartmouth College. More generally on subtle ways of establishing default behaviours, see Thaler & Sunstein 2008). There are also strong arguments for and some evidence of the usefulness of well-formulated guidelines and checklists in securing good practice (See Kelling 2009; Tilley 2006; Gawande 2010; Sidebottom et al 2012).

4.   Much work by the police aimed at detecting crime takes place in conditions of considerable uncertainty. There appear to be two ways of achieving relatively high detection rates for volume crime, such as burglary and car theft (Burrows et al 2005, Tilley et al 2007). One involves the development of stronger routine (low discretion) procedures where cases are passed from specialist unit to specialist unit for processing, the other the use of (higher-discretion) judgement, where cases are seen through to completion by a single person or team. Neither the specialist procedural nor the generalist discretionary arrangements can guarantee high detection rates. It depends on how well they are delivered, and either may be more appropriate according to context. The more discretionary may work best where there is a stable staff group, including experienced officers, who deal with a low volume of cases. The more procedural may work best with relatively inexperienced officers with a high turnover and a large volume of cases. In both instances strong supervision is needed, in the one case to inform sensible use of discretion and in the other to ensure compliance with standardised procedures. If these conclusions are correct, they suggest that in the complex world of policing, there may be different means to achieve preferred ends, involving different patterns of discretion or discipline, and that the choice of which will need to be contextually dependent.

In conclusion, I hope I have said enough to persuade you; (a) that issues of discretion and discipline in effecting improvements in policing are important; and (b) that high levels of discretion will always be needed for some areas of policing; (c) that discretion needs to be as informed as possible; (d) that the effectiveness of policing may be improved by developing more informed default routine behaviours, along the general lines shown in Figure 2; and (e) that inculcating preferred default actions is itself a complex matter. These conclusions suggest to me an important shared research agenda for universities and police services.


Figure 2: Discretion, discipline and improvement strategies and embedded improvement

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Observations from a Decade on the Inside:
Policing Cultures and Evidence Based Policing[6]

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Biography

Professor Betsy Stanko is Assistant Director, Corporate Development, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). Previously, she was a Professor of Criminology, teaching and researching at Clark University (USA), Brunel University, Cambridge University and Royal Holloway, University of London (where she remains a visiting Professor). She has published over 70 books and articles over her academic career. The most cited of these works is Intimate Intrusions: Women's Experiences of Male Violence, published in 1985. She has been awarded a number of lifetime achievement awards from the American Society of Criminology, most notably the Vollmer Award (1996), recognising outstanding influence of her academic work on criminal justice practice. From 1997-2002 she was the Director of the ESRC Violence Research Programme. In 2002, she joined the Cabinet Office, in the Prime Minister's Office of Public Services Reform, and in September 2003, she joined the MPS as a full time employee. She is a fellow of the Royal Society of the Arts.

What I would like to do today is to use three particular observations about evidence based policing that I have learned while working inside the police service over the past decade, map those onto some contemporary discussions in criminology, and be challenging about the slowness to change. One of the things academics ask me all the time is, 'why don't they take my research seriously?' 'Why can't we get police to use research in a different kind of way?' The last ten years of my career has been spent in trying to find a way to make research relevant to contemporary policing, and to action change in a very large police department. My police service employs over 55,000 people. That number will reduce, in four years' time – we are subject, like everyone else, to major cuts – and need to lose about £600m within the next four years. What impact this has on delivering policing to London remains to be seen. I am convinced that it is possible to mitigate the impact by embracing the use of evidence based practice.

I believe the important thing about efficiency is working better through research knowledge. There is a lot of debate today about 'what works', what is 'evidence', and how does it enable policing to do something differently? In my job we spend a lot of time talking about tactics, and sometimes we talk about *strategic tactics*. What I do, however, is *strategy*; trying to get a sense of what the 'big picture' is and how a 'big picture' mission would enable policing to work better. I will be arguing

[6] Held at Scottish Police College, Tulliallan Castle, 20 October 2011

today that while there's a lot of debate about 'what works' and energy expended looking at what an officer does when he or she leaves the station; do they turn left or right? There is less energy on getting police to harness 'what works' as a routine. I want to push the boundaries of 'what works' into the areas of theory and concept. My ambition while working inside the police service is not to justify a particular tactic, but to begin to change hearts, minds and behaviour about knowing how to choose a tactic and why.

Firstly in this talk, I will use my work around confidence to talk about a different way of thinking; necessary because there are so many changes in policing that require a better understanding of the public. To take one example, in London, a Mayor's Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC) has been created and begins in January 2012, and that will be a major change.

Mayor of London, Boris Johnson (The Daily Mail)

The governance of policing is about to change in England, becoming more local and in Scotland with the creation a single police service with 17,000 police officers. It is sometimes very difficult when working in a big space for change to cascade down learning to the front line. Under the UK coalition government confidence in policing is no longer the single, overarching target. But it would be wrong to forget about confidence, because it is critical to put the public at the heart of policing in order to ensure its legitimacy. With three days of disorder in London this August we know what happens when it breaks down (Stanko & Dawson 2013).

Secondly, I would also like to give you some insight from seven years' longitudinal research offering a conceptual insight to the policing of rape, a crime type where throughout the UK and the world the justice outcome is extremely challenged. Over the past eight years I have been asking 'what do the police know about rape from the reports they receive?' We still need to think quite differently about how that crime type happens. It is possible to think differently about a crime type; in the 30 years that I have been in this profession there has been a shift in the way the public thinks about domestic violence, the way we police it and legislate around it; such a shift in thinking has not been reached, I have to say, in the way we think about rape.

Finally, I will consider how the two examples above give us some insight into police improvement, and what I will term a 'neo-tribal resistance' to both outsider and insider evidence which impedes our use of research based evidence in policing. It's been a long sustained approach to get the Met to think differently about the information they have, so everything I'm going to be talking about is our own information; it's not somebody else's, it's ours, and that's important. This is not 'academic' information

which is not owned by us, it is our information and therefore our responsibility to take it seriously and understand exactly what people are telling us. It's not always the fast car that gets the villain; we have to be reminded that we don't need to do policing in the traditional way to be successful.

Over the past decade we have had a fast and furious debate about 'what works', and if crime science can help. Inside the Met I try to offer systematic use of knowledge and to suggest that there are ways of being systematic about the strategy to reduce crime. We know for example, that policing of problem places makes a difference; it's taken me ten years to have that adopted as a strategic point of view and we are now policing strategically by identifying the worst places in London and focusing differently upon them. New York has used impact zones for the last 15 years, with 20 out of 75 precincts being designated impact zones. Fifteen of those 20 have never changed over that time; but that's OK, because the strategy of New York is that they put more resources into those 20 most challenged zones, including all of their new recruits, than into the other 55; because they are the accepted as the worst areas. People spend a lot of time saying that crime data in high crime areas is useless; it's only a partial report of what happens out there. Absolutely true; I have no doubt that people who live in high crime areas report less than people who live in low crime areas; if they actually reported everything that they experienced, those high crime areas would just be higher. Observing 624 wards in London, I know where the top 20 high crime areas are, I know which streets remain 'high crime streets'; there's a persistence and consistence in the way that recorded crimes stack into and onto places that we need to pay attention to (Braga & Weisburd 2010).

When Safer Neighbourhoods community policing was introduced in 2004 in London, one of the things I wanted to do for the then new Commissioner, Ian Blair, was to provide him with the most robust information possible, so that when he stood up in public he knew precisely what was going on. I designed a questionnaire, a hybrid public attitude survey that wasn't quite like the British Crime Survey; it was much more about policing itself. Therefore since 2005 we have a long term tracker that enables us to take a look at people's opinions about the police. In 2004 we started with 8,000 survey interviews, we've been as high as 20,000, and given the current budget constraints we're now at 12,000 interviews a year; 3,000 people every quarter are asked how they feel about policing in London. The bit that's important to understand about me is that I was a qualitative researcher when I started; I am now rolling around in more data than anyone has ever had in their entire life – 800,000 crimes a year reports, 12.5 million calls from the public – we can use all the data that the Met has, analyse and statistically understand it. This survey data is now archived at the University of Essex.

Working with three academics from the Methodology Institute of the London School of Economics – Jonathan Jackson, Ben Bradford, and Katrin Hohl – we began to play with the data (Stanko B, Jackson J, Bradford B, Hohl K 2012). What this work has delivered is a management board accepted, signed off, approved, has-the-T-shirt model of public confidence in London, created by Ben and Jon. Thirty-two boroughs are performance-managed based on this model, and on a quarterly basis they get information about how well they are doing in the eyes of the public. The thing that police like

the most – effectiveness in dealing with crime – is very important; how do we support victims, how do we tackle and prevent crime. But we find that how well we engage with the public, listen to and understand the kinds of concerns that they have is the key driver of public confidence. We also ask: are police reliable if you call them, how well do police deal with antisocial behaviour, and how fairly do people feel they are treated. Fairness is absolutely critical in terms of thinking about public engagement and legitimacy of policing (Myhill and Quinton 2011). These are the main drivers of people's opinions of how good a job police are doing locally.

This model is a kind of 'nudge theory' which some of you may know a little about; what you are trying to do is get people, i.e. police officers, to change their behaviour. It is important to understand that the main driver of public confidence in the police in London is engagement with the community; second to that is fair treatment; third, is effectiveness in dealing with crime. When you talk to police officers, the first thing they say is 'we have got to be effective in the way we deal with crime; that is the way people judge us'. However, most people don't deal with the police directly, they therefore judge you by how well you reach out to them and if they think you treat people fairly.

Figure 1: Contributors to confidence in policing.

When I started this work back in 2005 I had concerns with the concept of 'fear of crime', and the aim of this work was partly to challenge the Blair government's obsession with that concept. Fear of crime is a driver, but not a major driver, of public confidence in policing; as we have seen, the main driver of public confidence in policing is how well people understand the police as engaging with, listening to, and understanding the concerns of the community. If you don't have contact with police, then how do you measure that? Not through the *Daily Mail*.

Worrying about crime	Alleviating local ASB	Effectiveness in dealing with crime	Fair treatment	Engagement with the community

Figure 2: Drivers of public confidence in policing, from the MPS survey, 2005 – 2012.

It's a difficult thing, but in London getting information direct from the police was critical to public confidence, in the form of local feedback from police on a neighbourhood basis to residents through their letter boxes (Wünsch & Hohl 2009). We have 630 Safer Neighbourhood Teams in London who provided information via newsletters; we recommend that the information provided to residents group simply around three areas: 'this is what you said' are priorities, this is what we've done about it, and this is how you contact us'. We now can show, statistically and through an experiment, that if you proactively feedback to people, public confidence increases (Hohl, Bradford and Stanko 2009). Because residents know what you know, and you know what residents know, and if they have anything else to tell you then residents know how to contact you – that's basically the structure of the newsletter.

By no means was this good news to my police officers. They didn't like the fact that we were asking the public directly about policing, particularly those who didn't have any contact with us. It wasn't people you knew, but a random selection of a weighted representation of the population. This model is tested every quarter with over 3000 interviews, and so far the strength of the model remains.

So the lesson here is how do we think very differently about the police's engagement with people? Because engagement with people is very, very important; not just engagement with the 'usual suspects', not the ones who come to your meetings, but everybody. And it's a real challenge. How you reach out to those people who don't necessarily come to those meetings, and particularly the hard to reach? We suggest that letterbox communication is a great equaliser in terms of engagement.

One of the things we learned from a five year tracker of Safer Neighbourhoods is that, interestingly enough, people begin to converge around what the kinds of crime that are most important in their local areas. What we found is that you can ask a lot of different people a lot of different questions about crime; some people know about serious and organised crime, they live next to it, it affects their lives. It's very local, very specific. They understand the difference between volume and violent crime; again, some evidence about how it exists very locally; and they understand incivilities. But when you get people together we tend to find that opinions converge not around whether it should be about traffic or dog 'mess' – and you can have endless discussions about that – but whether or not there's a serious problem in the neighbourhood. People tend to be more altruistic around serious crime than around the petty stuff. That finding comes out very strongly when we looked at eight wards in London over five years and interviewed a sample of 400 people on a yearly basis.

Generally the public do care about crime, and they do have opinions, but those opinions are driven by what happens to family and friends. They may not be the direct victims of crime, they may not live in high crime areas, but if anybody they know has had any contact with the police this personal contact with other people informs the way they answer the questionnaire. It isn't just finger in the air; it's what they hear about policing from other people, often family, friends and neighbours. So hearing about police contact is just as important as having contact.

The five year tracker told us that the Met's own leaflet is the preferred form of finding out about local policing. We did a number of focus groups about what form that would actually take, so the leaflet itself is evidence based. People take that leaflet as a direct form of contact, and it is positive. We also know that fair and respectful treatment – and I will keep coming back to fair and respectful treatment – predicts whether the public view the police as legitimate. Public confidence can be influenced.

But I have learned to never, ever underestimate the value of the legitimacy of policing. What we know from this work and from other work by Ben Bradford, Jon Jackson and Katrin Hohl is that issues around public trust are absolutely critical to positive policing and justice outcomes. The lesson for this is that we need to think continuously on how to maximise public cooperation, and this is perhaps where we have not done very well. The issue of fair treatment is critical in terms of cooperation in policing. We know that detections often arise from information provided by victims and witnesses; so you want to keep the people on side. We know that those who believe in state legitimacy are more willing to comply with the law, and a forthcoming piece of work shows that people are less likely and less willing to act outside the law if they believe that the forces of the state are legitimate (Jackson et al 2012).

Figure 3: Confidence in Local and London-wide Policing (MPS PAS 09/10-11/12 Rolling 12 month data)

Something interesting has happened in London, as you can see in Figure 3. When we started Safer Neighbourhoods, if you asked people generically about policing in London, you got a more favourable response compared to local policing – what I call the 'Scotland Yard Effect' – seen in pink here. That has changed; there's something going on about the Scotland Yard brand that is diminishing in the eyes of the public. It may only be a reduction by 5%, but because a long standing pattern has begun to change, it is an interesting finding. My goal when we started Safer Neighbourhoods was to increase people's confidence in local policing to the level of London policing; it seems if it has just surpassed that. That is significant, and we're kicking off a number of pieces of work around what that means for the London Metropolitan Police service as the 'corporation'.

In the last ten years I have been in the Met, there has been a complete transformation in technology – there are for instance 20,000 images on YouTube of people in the riots. There are pages and pages and pages of images on the Metropolitan Police website of the people they are trying to arrest for disorder. If you look at the imagery that the public themselves share; this imagery is interesting for our observations about legitimacy and the state. Technology itself has become an instrument of democracy and transparency, and you would not be surprised if I suggest that imagery around the police and policing of the riots was particularly strong. I was in the United States at the time of the disorder and watched it on television. For those of you who haven't been to London, it was a localised disorder affecting a few postcodes. It was a firework, but localised. Lots of people came and went, travelled about London using their 'Oyster cards' touching in and touching out. They went to work on Monday just after the disorder began, and they went to work on Tuesday a bit more nervously but they still went to work. One of the central questions we asked in the MPS is why did the riots take place? Why did they happen? Many of the reports on the disorder found a common theme in the accounts of those who participated: feeling unfairly treated by police.

Metropolitan Police Service Officers during the London disorders, August 2011.

I show the audience this leaflet which was found in Tottenham and put on YouTube. The leaflet advises people not to go to the police. It's important to see the way in which different presentations of what happened are portrayed by the leaflet authors. 'Get a haircut and colour, grow a beard, wear glasses… DO keep your house clean. Get rid of spray cans, demo related stuff, dodgy texts / photos on your phone. Don't make life easy for them [the police] by having drugs, weapons or anything else illegal in the house.' The leaflet acknowledges an appearance of legitimacy through quite conventional behaviour. Even rioters know about how to get a message out to a local community: leaflets through the letterbox.

Leaflet found in Tottenham advising people against handing themselves into the police.

Drawing from procedural justice, we can link the disorder to people's willingness to comply with the law. The analysis of the Public Attitude Survey in Jackson et al. (2012) suggests that there is a link between policing and the influence of the state itself. Previously poorly understood, legitimacy itself and the way that people feel about policing intersects as a form of social control/compliance. Attitudes to violence are also a part of how people feel about legitimacy of the state. The more inclined people are to view the state as legitimate, the more negative their view of

extra-legal violence is. From interviews with people in London, what we're finding is actually quite significant conceptual challenges in the way police treat people.

I now turn to the second observation. I am using victims' allegations of rape as a victim-centred look at the need and use for policing. We've looked at rape in London over the last six years by coding up every allegation of rape in the Met in the first two months of each financial year, and this study is continuing. What is striking about those who report rape to the police is that an overwhelming majority of victims are vulnerable. In 1985 I published a book called Intimate Intrusions in which I talked about vulnerability and respectability; I had no idea how strongly the data inside a police service would reflect that observation. What we find in the majority of cases of reported rape in London – and 92% of them are women – is that the image of rape and the way that it is investigated assumed invulnerability. The approach to the investigation by the police is that the victim was so invulnerable that the violence she confronts was so strong that he overpowered her; previously described as the 'real rape' victim (Estrich 1987).

However, the majority of the cases of rape in London, a large city in which you may expect a higher number of stranger rapes – and I would suggest that this is probably true across the country and the world – are that in 75% of rapes the victim knows the offender. (The most recent US National Institute of Justice report on female victims of sexual violence by the way shows that 78% of sexual violence involves an offender who was a family member, intimate partner, friend or acquaintance.) This is then 'evidence' and requires that we think differently about how rape is investigated. Twenty-five years ago I would never have guessed that the percentage of known rapists would be as high in reports to the police. The major vulnerabilities within which rapes take place and are, importantly, reported to the police, are youth (victim is under 18 at the time of the assault), mental health, alcohol and drug misuse prior to the rape and domestic violence.

The vast majority of those who report rape to the MPS then can be considered to be vulnerable in some way or other (87% in 2005; 84% in 2010).

- One third victims who report rape are aged below 18 at the time of the offence (33% in 2005; 34% in 2010)
- One in six of victims who report rape have a mental health issue (18% in 2005; 14% in 2010)
- One third of victims who report rape have consumed alcohol / drugs prior to the rape (35% in 2005; 35% in 2010)
- One quarter of victims who report rape are or have been in an intimate relationship with their assailant (24% in 2005; 26% in 2010)

Over time, looking at six years' of data, you can see that the outcome of the allegations has not much changed. We now have the largest rape response unit in the world, and there have been changes to police practice. If you look at the key attrition points in Figure 4, these show the differences over time:

- More allegations are classified as crime (67% in 2005; 91% in 2010); noting a change in the initial contact and the recording of the crime of rape
- More suspects are identified (53% in 2005; 72% in 2010)
- More suspects are arrested (39% in 2005; 53% in 2010)
- Fewer suspects are charged (44% of all arrested suspects in 2005; 26% of all arrested suspects in 2010)
- Once charged, more suspects are convicted (31% in 2005; 44% in 2010)

The overall outcome is that in 2005, 5% of all allegations lead to a conviction. In 2010, it is 6%.

Figure 4: Attrition rates by percentage of all allegations, MPS 2005 – 2010.

When we think about evidence changing police outcomes, progress can be really, really slow. Some of the outcomes may not be easily altered when the view of rape still heavily relies on imagining 'real rape' as the main problem. I believe these findings require us to think about whether we are focusing the problem in investigation in the right place. I suggest that the problem is in 'evidencing' how an offender exploited vulnerability. So why is this so difficult to see or explain inside the police service? *(The Jimmy Saville investigation makes this point even more strongly than I ever could. BS, 2013).*

I summarise through some observations about police culture and its relationship to changing policing through evidence based findings/research. I am a non-uniformed 'Professor' and I have been able to improve police analysis of our own information from the inside. But my experience regarding analysis and evidence both for confidence and rape is that some people (that is, police leaders and frontline officers) get it (the link between the research and changing what one does), and some people don't. My experience is that the research observations have a better chance of being successful when you have a senior uniformed sponsor using the analysis in decision making. I can put on the best show possible and without having someone say 'yes, we're going to do it that way' – without having my confidence model approved by the management board, put through the performance regime and printed on the t-shirt – nobody would understand it. It is still a struggle to define from a policing point of view 'what you do differently in policing' as a consequence of knowing what drives public confidence.

Police scholars and even fiction writers have written and researched into police culture and how uniformed officers behave, think and act. The studied behaviours of the police have achieved a kind of 'folklore'; for example: the use of force, coercion, racism, sexism, anti-intellectualism, corruption, biased law enforcement, secrecy, exclusivity, loyalty, brotherhood, guarded trust, competitive, authoritarian, entitled, bullying, abusive, good humoured, brave, helpful, reliable, selfless have been part of studies of police culture.

There is another part of police culture, and that is that 'only uniforms can make decisions'. Even though I am in insider in the performance regime, it has taken an extraordinary amount of time to have new cutting edge academic research and police information practically used inside my own police service. This is my challenge to you: think about verified evidence, look at what outsiders do, it offers some interesting ways of seeing the world. It's not just about tactical evidence, helping you to turn right or left on your way out of the station. Using research requires a change in the way officers think about the world.

Let me offer a couple of pieces of advice. Using conceptual evidence requires shifting the way 'we do things here', and conceptualising things differently – such as locating rape victims along a continuum of vulnerability – may also challenge the way investigation is routinely approached. Evidence is not the only the way one adapts to 'turning right or left out of the station', the evidence presented here requires changing the way one 'sees' and does things, firstly by accepting and incorporating evidence which has been verified by those outside the service, as a core part of improvement. The two things I have talked about today – confidence in policing and rape – do require changes in the way you see something and the way you do something; it does require changing behaviour.

In terms of confidence, I would suggest that the change requires moving beyond the uniform to understand public need. I regularly encounter police having difficulty in understanding what the public 'want'. We still need active translation and transition. We're still as a police service not very good at dealing with all of the public. We deal with 'the usual suspects', we deal with politicians, but ordinary people on the street and trying to understand what they want and require? I am still encounter a 'uniformed' view of the world as opposed to a 'public' view of the world. I think it's really important (though difficult) to think and feel like a citizen, because then you understand the importance of the job in terms of serving the state and the people. I firmly believe in democratic policing. People in the Middle East are dying for democracy; and we need to understand that people are dying for democratic and legitimate state power.

In terms of thinking about rape, we need to rethink how the reporting of rape and its investigation could feature on documenting the exploitation of vulnerability, as the policing of domestic violence is now being seen through the lens of 'power and control'. We need to think about what would change if we wrapped the investigation around the offender's exploitation as opposed to invulnerability of the victim. I believe this changes the entire approach to investigation. I can guarantee it won't always lead to a successful prosecution, because the cases and rape allegations

that I have read are messy. As the evidence consistently tells us, these allegations arise between people who know each other, they are allegations where people with mental health issues are exploited – of course they're difficult to manage in a criminal justice system! But how else are we – in this advanced democratic state – going challenge sexual exploitation? Sexual violence happens so often as exploitation. The dominant image of rape remains of the bush lurker overwhelming invulnerability. Actually what we are talking about – what the data overwhelmingly tell us – is that we are dealing with crime that is about an intentional exploitation of vulnerability.

Yet, strange but true, across continents, across the world, I'm still bridging, translating, challenging with humour and respect and some impatience – and optimism. I hope that you join me in the journey to make evidence accessible and used by the police service today.

Thank You.

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The New Police Professionalism – Democracy, Evidence Based Practice and a 21st Century Profession[7]

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Biography

Peter Neyroud is a former Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, Chief Executive for the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA), where he led the £3bn Airwave programme to provide police radios, including the installation of radio in the London underground and for the Olympics and the IMPACT programme to create the Police National Database. He is also a former Vice-President of the Association of Chief Police Officers and a widely published author of books, articles and papers on policing and Editor of the Oxford Journal of Policing. His last major piece of work in policing was a 'Fundamental Review of Police Leadership and Training' for the Home Secretary, published in April 2011. Since leaving the Police Service at the end of 2010, Peter has created a professional research consultancy, is completing a PhD and directing a major research programme at Cambridge University into Crime Harm, and is providing training, leadership development and consultancy nationally and internationally.

I am very pleased to be here and feel very privileged to be addressing you in this stunning venue. I am going to try and cover quite a lot of ground, because I don't get audiences like this very often; and you are a very impressive audience, a great cross-section of those to whom this topic matters, being police officers, those interested in their governance, and proper performance. So hold on to your hats – or not as the case may be.

I want to start by talking a little bit about the 'old professionalism'; the one that is passing away, but which hasn't quite gone yet; and from the 'old' to the 'new', now 12 years in to the 21st century. I particularly want to demonstrate the evidence that dismantles the myths that most of us – and I would say all of us – think work. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I then want to talk a little bit about police professionalism and politics, and how we might we might, in the midst of all this change, develop a 'new professionalism' for the future.

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[7] Held at the Playfair Library, University of Edinburgh, 25 October 2012

August Vollmer (1876-1955)

To begin by going back a little; most of you won't know August Vollmer (1876-1955), but he is worth looking up; he was Chief of Police in Berkeley, California between 1909 and 1932. Vollmer was an unusual character, particularly in the early part of the twentieth century because he was seriously interested in professionalizing policing at a time when it most definitely was not. It was he that first to put radios in police cars, it was he – and bear in mind this was in 1920 – that focused on recruiting women and African-Americans into policing, because he felt it mattered in building relationships between the police and the community. He professionalised crime investigation, and lastly, and probably most importantly, he advocated college education for cops, at a time when that was definitely not the way that they were recruited. Early twentieth century police officers in the United States were in most cases recruited because of who they voted for and who they knew; not what they knew and what they did when they got on the ground.

Vollmer left a legacy – and it is important for Chiefs to leave a legacy – in the form of a disciple, O.W. Wilson (1900-1972), who was chief in Wichita and Chicago. It was Wilson in the 1950s who described the 'old professionalism'; a schema of policing built around rapid response to calls and deterrent patrol; the omnipresent cop, who would reduce crime, and reactive response to crime prevention. It's the 'old professionalism' that a lot of us still do, and I will go on to why that might be a mistake. He was the founder of one of the first police science degrees at Wichita University, and not only a police officer, but throughout his career a 'clinical' Professor.

Air Marshall Lord Trenchard (1873-1956)

The British approach is a contrasting tradition, or one might say, the English approach – and I shall be careful to distinguish where appropriate between the English and Scottish approaches. In England, where a police service was deemed to be in need of reform you got a direct entry soldier, Air Marshall Lord Trenchard (1873-1956); Metropolitan Police Commissioner 1931 to 1935. He founded the Hendon Police College to educate an 'officer class' who could 'control' the police officers, who after the police strike of 1919 were deemed to be slightly suspect. Trenchard's approach to cure and create professionalism among the police was to bring 'chaps' in from the best public schools; and having been to one of those, Winchester College, I can imagine just the sort of chaps whom he brought in. The response to this initiative was interesting in that it wasn't just the police service that disliked this approach; it was also unpopular with the right-wing press. There was the most astonishing selection of cartoons in papers like the *Daily Mail* lampooning Trenchard's 'genstables'; one depicts a constable serving tea to a senior officer with a silver tray, the title 'Butler' across his lapel. It is a remarkable sign of the cross-over between professionalism and the expectation of policing. The status of the police officer, their knowledge of society, and the way in which police influence society and are influenced by it has many resonances across a long period; I could have shown you up to 50 political cartoons on this type of subject going back to the 1930s; it is remarkable how strong this theme is.

An American academic, Steve Herbert argued in an article (Herbert 2006), drawn from his research into community policing in Seattle, that the relationship between police professionals in democracy centres around three concepts: subservience, separation and 'generativity'. Subservience he sees as an essential part of what the police should be; they should be servants of democracy, and their very responses to the public's calls are testament to that. The requirement that they consult and listen, that they are held to account by a variety of mechanisms, that there is no such thing in policing an 'independent professionalism', it's not the type of professionalism that you can self-govern. He also distinguished two aspects of separation – looking across primarily American policing but it undoubtedly translates across the Atlantic – that we also need to be independent under the law. That matters not just in the independence of police officers, but also in the legitimacy of the police service; that decisions that the police make are seen to be independent, fair, and not under other subjective influences. Also there's an aspect which is probably more problematic, and

that is that the police themselves want to be culturally separate; it's easier to exercise authority in some respects when you feel comfortable and remote than when you are proximate and part of the community.

According to Herbert, it's not good enough to have just a balance of subservience and separation, you also have to have what he describes as 'generativity'; the police not only have, but should have some influence on society. For example, that the police actually structure the citizens' understanding of crime by the ways in which the police respond to it, and by the ways in which the police record it; the police also project an incredibly important moral image in the way in which they go about things. To take an important recent example, the caring image of the Dyfed Powys police and the way that they handled the little missing girl (the case of five-year-old April Jones abducted from Machynlleth in Wales on 1 October 2012) was quite extraordinary. I've never heard such positive feedback from crime journalists, who are generally not the most compassionate bunch; they were deeply moved in the way in which the force and surrounding forces acted, demonstrating a care from the community with the police at the forefront.

Now back to the old professionalism, where was the balance between subservience and separation? In Vollmer's case it was about cutting free from the political corruption of the nineteenth century; in O.W. Wilson's case it was around an operational strategy, but unfortunately O.W. Wilson's strategy didn't stack up. During the first wave of research into the police it was established that random patrol did not produce the kind of effective deterrence that Wilson had argued it would; rapid response did not lead to more crimes prevented; and reactive detection produced little more than information from the public.

So we entered the era of 'nothing works' at the end of the 1970s; this was the point when I joined the police service. In the USA random patrol became associated with racial profiling, producing a crisis of confidence between the police service and the public, particularly amongst African-Americans; just think back to the Rodney King beating, and the riots that followed. In the UK there was the watershed of the Confait case (the murder of Maxwell Confait in 1972) which raised questions around the treatment of vulnerable suspects and the emphasis on detection based on what proved to be false confession. That case led to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, leading in turn to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984. The subsequent Brixton riots also produced a Public Inquiry (Scarman 1981) that was critical in UK policing in forcing us to reconsider the balance between crime fighting and order maintenance. Fundamental distinctions between what are the police here to do; are we here just to detect crimes, or are there whole ranges of things to be held in balance?

One response, out of a search for a mission, when nothing worked out of those three 'R's, was community policing. It was a response partly plucked from Herman Goldstein's ground breaking book, Problem-Oriented Policing, published in 1990, although Goldstein had been talking about a problem-solving model throughout most of the 1980s. His work in problem-solving had evolved from his earlier concerns about the way in which police use discretion. The community policing

model was given a huge boost in the 1980s when the first Harvard session, a convening of American, British and Australian police chiefs, discussed the watershed in policing and where to go next. There was a huge dichotomy in that debate between the 'old professional' Daryl Gates (Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department from 1978 to 1992) and Lee P. Brown, who had been the chief in Houston (the city's first African-American Police Chief, 1982 to 1990), and served as the commissioner in New York, where he was an advocate of community policing. Community policing undoubtedly emerged from those sessions as the default standard, the model that most forces would follow over the next 30 years. There are very few police chiefs or politicians that would say that their force is not doing community policing.

There was a second response, slightly later, but nevertheless very British, which has also become a world movement. There is nobody, at least in most parts of the world, who would not claim they were doing intelligence-led policing, because you wouldn't want to be unintelligent. It was a distinctively British contribution which evolved – and I was involved in the early development of it – as a response to concerns that our pursuit of detection had led to some very serious miscarriages of justice. Police were also were spending far too much time trying to detect crimes by a variety of exciting means, such as pitching up at major prisons and getting people to confess to crimes that which they had not necessarily committed. Intelligence-led policing was also an attempt to manage a deficit in effectiveness; in contrast with community policing which was an attempt to 'do' the frontline role better.

The alternative approach to improving the management of policing began with William J. 'Bill' Bratton's (Police Commissioner in New York City, 1994 to 1996) development of Compstat in New York at the turn of the 1990s. The critical thing about this is in some ways not so much the mechanics of Compstat, but the fact that what underpins it is the rediscovery of police confidence that they *could* fight crime; in marked contrast to the 1980s when there was a comprehensive belief that the police could *not*. Very few police chiefs in America or this side of the Atlantic stood up in the 1980s and said that they could reduce crime, because they didn't have a lot of evidence to support that fact. There were two big changes that contributed to Bill Bratton's success, one of which was the opportunity to deal with 'big data'. In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, he now had data on where crime was taking place that he could use to put police officers in the right place. The second big change was the emergence of 'evidence based tactics', the first being 'cops on the dots' – hot spot policing wasn't quite as sophisticated as it is now, but nevertheless it was a critical component. Compstat, determined leadership, and a change of tactics, combined with other factors, produced a very significant shift; there's a big debate still about how far the police affected that but I don't think there's any doubt that they did affect it and they continue to affect it.

And then we come to the most recent development, evidence based policing, which underlies the 30-year period from 'nothing works', to knowing 'what works'. Firstly, if you focus policing in high crime places; secondly, if you focus on tackling the most harmful and persistent offenders; thirdly, if you focus on protecting vulnerable victims; and fourthly on increasing the legitimacy of the service, you will have a very significant impact on crime. These are what I call 'the four faces of evidence based policing', supported by consistent, credible evidence from over 30 systematic reviews on the

Campbell Crime and Justice website. Yet despite 25 years' of research into the police, politicians and the public are still thinking about policing and crime based on intuition rather than researched facts, the 'I'm a police chief and these things work' argument.

To take some examples of these 'myths' and to answer them with the 'facts' from those systematic reviews: The first myth is that 'more police on patrol mean less crime so let's get "more bobbies on the beat"'. Would that it worked liked that – we would all have solved the problems and gone home. Fact: more focused patrol of hotspots and targeted problem-solving will most definitely deliver crime reductions, but there is a considerable amount of finesse; it's the same as keyhole surgery – you don't just do it, there is a considerable amount of practice and art required to get it right. The same goes with the increasing evidence that targeted problem-solving will deliver an even greater reduction and probably a more sustainable one.

As a chief officer, the response you will get when you say 'I'm going to do hot spot policing' is: 'but crime will just "move around the corner"'. No; and I would guess if I did a straw poll of this audience, and if I asked you that question before, that 90% of this audience would have agreed with that statement, and that 90% would be wrong. Far from displacement, most studies now show a diffusion of benefits from targeted hot spots, that crime doesn't go round the corner. You get a benefit around the hot spots, because actually crime happens in the hot spots because there are factors of both people and place there which contribute to it. So, therefore target hot spots.

The third myth is that most of us feel that prosecuting offenders in court is an effective deterrent; and most of us would be wrong. Formal processing of offenders – and there has been study, after study, after study, including a whole series of randomized trials – that tends to suggest a negative impact on offending, particularly among young offenders. Not least of which, how many of your actually offences actually end up in court? It's about 2% to 3% of the total offences that are committed in your communities, so if you think you are going to rely on courts to reduce crime, forget it; it's not going to be effective. 'Tough' approaches should only be used carefully in order to target the most persistent and harmful of offenders.

Another myth is that community policing prevents crime, but there is very little evidence to support this, and there is a systematic review that goes into that evidence in some detail (Mazerolle et al 2012). However, community policing does have a significant impact on police legitimacy, and legitimacy matters. Increasingly we know that legitimacy is a crucial component in helping people to keep the law; so instead of focusing on those who break it, focus on strengthening community efficacy and on the way in which people keep the law and don't respond with hostility.

Our final myth is one which I've had throughout my career from my colleagues, and that is that traditional methods work best. In burglary detection, the most recent randomised controlled trials show that the most effective way of identifying suspects is through DNA; more effective than even fingerprints, let alone 'traditional detective work' such as going house to house and arresting and interviewing suspects, which is virtually useless in solving the crime.

Why do these myths matter? I conducted an analysis of a cross-section of the campaign pledges of Police and Crime Commissioners in England and Wales; and found a reliance on 'increasing arrests and prosecutions'; pledges to 'put more officers on the beat', with only limited reference to policies that are supported by evidence. It matters that we get this right, because otherwise what we are asking the police service to do is something that doesn't work, and then holding them to account for something that doesn't work, by means and methods and measurements that don't work; which isn't very professional.

Whenever I teach police officers – and I taught a group of high potential officers last week in a UK force – I go through some of this evidence and I ask them if have they read it, and they haven't. It is an extraordinary part of policing that we know that most police officers can recite to you the Theft Act, but they don't know how to prevent the act of theft; it is not part of their education. The current influences on policing are these: firstly, the 'clinical experience model', which is based on just coming up to 200 years' worth of clinical experience; secondly, professional traditions in different forces – and here in Edinburgh we are in one of the oldest police forces, older in fact than the Metropolitan Police which is traditionally thought of as being the first; thirdly, law and bureaucracy, and fourthly, politics.

The standard set of police tactics are preventive patrol, arrest, prosecution and post release supervision. Everywhere I go – from Edinburgh, to India, to Australia – these are the standard tactics; and when I ask the question, 'so how do they work?' I get blank looks. If you were embarking on a medical treatment, you would want to know how it worked, the possible side effects, and if the doctor – or in this case, the police officer – was actually qualified to deliver the treatment. Personally I'm not up for having an operation by someone with clinical experience who hasn't read the scientific evidence.

Police officers often don't even know the active ingredients of deterrence, but they are, according to work by Professor Daniel S. Nagin (Durlauf & Nagin 2013): severity, certainty and celerity. Each one of these ingredients matters, and you would think police officers would want to know this, and know which of these elements would apply; you would think this might be part of the basic training for police officers, much more than subsection 3.1 of the Licensing Act. Rather more important than the questions I found in the Police Inspection examination in England Wales, which was: 'you are standing on the forecourt of a licensed premises on a hot day, and the licensee offers you a glass of water, what offence has taken place?' To which my response was 'I don't care!' It is an offence in English law for a licensee to offer refreshment to a police officer on duty, but goodness me; I've never quite thought that we were going to enforce that one.

Like all medicines, deterrence will only work if you follow the instructions on the packet; meaning, *if you don't implement it properly it won't work*; if you don't diagnose the condition correctly it won't work, and some patients will experience some serious side effects. For example, if you focus only on stop and search you are highly likely to end up with a high degree of disproportionate stop and search of minority communities; it is a worldwide phenomenon, not limited to the UK. And with some chronic conditions, you may need to repeat the treatment. So let me illustrate this by taking a problem like burglaries. The traditional response and methods of detection are typically flooding areas with extra patrols and general campaigns to encourage crime prevention. They have permeated so much into policing that we can see them in the bureaucracy of the crime report; these are the boxes that every investigating officer feels they have to tick, because they have been there – and I have tracked them back in historical documents – for 150 years.

Now the evidence based approach; firstly **predictive prevention patrols** – you want to prevent burglary and we can do so; but do you know where they are going to happen rather than where they have happened? And the answer is you might be surprised to know that with around 50% to 60% accuracy we can predict where burglaries are likely to take place by using statistical techniques. If that is the case then surely we would be putting resources where they are about to take place? This is being tested at the moment in Birmingham.

The second evidence based approach is a **focus on solvability**, which has been around for a while with some work by John E. Eck (Professor of Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati, USA), but has never really been followed through, looking at what factors lead to the solving of burglary; and by the way, they have changed hugely in 30 years. When John first looked at this, you didn't have DNA, even fingerprint technology was paper copies and local databases. Now, we have a great opportunity and it would be a good idea to look at how and why we are successful.

Figure 1 shows a piece of analysis using a 'Forest plot'; the key with a Forest plot is to look to the right of the line and that which is to the right of the line shows that it is of significant effect, showing that it has been detected. Items on the left, which interestingly was house to house completed, shows you that it is not on the whole leading to detection. Looking at the two furthest to the right, one is DNA which is significant, and the other – one we don't invest enough time and energy towards – is footwear marks recovered; footwear is like a fingerprint if used properly and is remarkably effective at identifying perpetrators. You would like to know this if you were developing a strategy to tackle burglary. Moreover, this piece of research was carried out by a serving police officer.

Study or Subgroup	Undetected Mean	SD	Total	Detected Mean	SD	Total	Weight	Mean Difference IV, Fixed, 95% CI
Offence Duration	20.08	104.42	9174	13.14	60.93	1106	98.5%	6.94 [2.76, 11.12]
Time to Police attend	171.26	492.97	9826	132.26	532.75	1051	1.5%	39.00 [5.35, 72.65]
Total (95% CI)			19000			2157	100.0%	7.43 [3.28, 11.57]

Heterogeneity: Chi² = 3.43, df = 1 (P = 0.06); I² = 71%
Test for overall effect: Z = 3.51 (P = 0.0004)

Study or Subgroup	Undetected		Detected		Weight	Mean Difference IV, Fixed, 95% CI
CCTV preserved	412	1257	3476	10512	24.7%	0.99 [0.87, 1.12]
Burg in progress report	106	1257	406	10512	3.9%	2.29 [1.84, 2.86]
Witnessed	279	1257	983	10512	7.9%	2.83 [2.44, 3.28]
Suspect name recorded	1257	1257	1843	10512	0.0%	11827.39 [739.05, 189280.93]
Suspect description	20	1257	87	10512	0.9%	1.94 [1.19, 3.16]
Suspect disturbed	227	1257	1045	10512	9.1%	2.00 [1.71, 2.34]
Suspect seen	277	1257	904	10512	7.5%	3.00 [2.59, 3.49]
Suspect's vehicle seen	51	1257	206	10512	2.1%	2.12 [1.55, 2.89]
Media appeal completed	71	1257	404	10512	4.0%	1.50 [1.16, 1.94]
Description sus vehicle	11	1257	69	10512	0.7%	1.34 [0.71, 2.53]
Stolen property recovered	248	1257	1145	10512	9.7%	2.01 [1.73, 2.34]
House to house completed	945	1257	9519	10512	25.0%	0.32 [0.27, 0.36]
Fingerprints recovered	267	1257	388	10512	3.2%	7.04 [5.94, 8.33]
DNA recovered	167	1257	95	10512	0.9%	16.80 [12.96, 21.78]
Footwear marks recovered	62	1257	29	10512	0.3%	18.75 [12.02, 29.27]
Total (95% CI)		18855		157680	100.0%	2.72 [2.60, 2.84]
Total events	4400		20579			

Heterogeneity: Chi² = 1596.94, df = 14 (P < 0.00001); I² = 99%
Test for overall effect: Z = 42.90 (P < 0.00001)

Figure 1: Forest Plots – Burglary Dwelling Completed Offences (Paine, 2012)

I am completing a piece of research with Professor Larry Sherman (Cosma, Sherman and Neyroud: forthcoming); we've taken 100,000 criminal records from the PNC with the support of ACPO and for the first time analysed them statistically, in order to identify which offenders and how accurately we can predict those at a high risk of committing a high harm offence – serious assaults, serious sexual offence, robbery, and arson.

Figure 2: High, Medium and low risk offenders (Cosma, Sherman & Neyroud: forthcoming)

Our latest data shows that 2% are high harm, and that prediction is more than 80% reliable. But if that's the case, if you can be much more accurate than you used to be by using very large databases, logically you would focus more of your resources on the high harm group, and think about strategies in the low harm group to free up time and focus. This would also apply to focusing around the likelihood of victims being victimized again and the strategies that can be used. This is a piece of UK research going back 20 years which we still haven't used sufficiently; where we focus on victims and areas that have been burgled, 'target harden' around victims in a cocooning strategy, and use of Neighbourhood Watch in high crime areas.

Operation Turning Point is a piece of my own research in Birmingham, where you might just take that group of first time or low harm offenders and combine deterrence and desistance treatment, taking them out of the system altogether. In which case given the legitimacy issues about just taking offenders out of the system, particularly burglary offenders, what would you do if you didn't prosecute them? In this case you might decide to put them into some sort of **deferred prosecution**, for example using curfews, drugs treatment and non-association, where you hold prosecution over them and test whether you can encourage them in desistance. That is being tested at the moment in a randomized trial, which I think is the first time in this country that prosecutions have ever been randomized.

So that's how you might deal with burglary; I haven't gone through the entire evidence based resource list, but those are some of the tools that are emerging from the research and being developed and being tested now. And by the way, that piece of work on solvability was not done by an academic but by a serving chief inspector, as part of his Master's programme.

It is perfectly possible for properly trained police officers to use data, in a new professional model. We should be using evidence to test practice and practice innovation to generate research. We should be requiring all practitioners to qualify and keep qualified against that type of evidence; because if we don't know it, we can't use it, and if you don't know it, you are resistant to using it because you are frightened of it. We should require managers and leaders to be qualified to manage and lead. But we also need some continuity in this; a professional body that can ensure that knowledge is made available, maintained in a careful way, continually tested and disseminated to the profession and beyond. Police officers have a habit of leaving the profession early; we therefore lose knowledge rapidly, without any means of professional retention.

There have been some very **important developments** in the new professionalism, and that is that we have had a huge increase in the number of Systematic Reviews from the Campbell Collaboration on Crime and Justice (hosted by Norway); this involves taking all of the evidence in a particular subject and doing a meta-analysis across it, looking for problems and effects; what works across a whole series of studies. Five years ago there were only four or five; we now have over 35 reviews. We also have the development this year at George Mason University (Virginia, USA) of translation tools like the Evidence Based Crime Center Matrix, developed with the NPIA/National College of Policing, and POLKA, UK; a comprehensive set of current 'high quality studies' which have evaluated policing using a control versus treatment. There is a police online learning application which I was responsible for developing at NPIA – again it's about trying to make the evidence systematically available to police officers.

But we also need a revolution in **training**. We have trained ourselves, to ourselves in the same way for around about 180 years; and that *simply has to stop*. What we have trained for 180 years is not good enough to sustain us for another 200 years; policing has to reinvent itself, but above all it has to reinvent its training, by turning National Police Training Colleges into Police Universities, and integrating police training with higher education. In the 'Age of Austerity', which I doubt is going to go away any time soon, the pressure for more cost-effective policing becomes ever more important. We need to provide, as the George Mason University Crime Center Matrix does, a tool for police officers to use to show them the evidence.

Figure 3: George Mason University Crime Center Matrix

If you were an officer accessing the matrix, you could click on one of these dots, for example 'individuals' if you were focusing on individual offenders, then click on the left hand box and see what works. And that would start a trail of evidence as to what things would work, and these are summarised in a way that any police officer could access, understand and apply. It gives you a starter for ten, the sort of things that might work in your circumstances. We do still need primary research, and we also need to ensure that the evidence that we have is available as widely as possible. I think one of the things that SIPR is doing which is particularly important is the practitioner–academic crime research which is critical, and sharing that is critical. Not enough research is being done in rural areas, and there are a lot of rural areas in Scotland. I was in Norway last week, which has vast rural areas, and they don't have a hot spot strategy for the tundra!

In the case of Norway, the Norwegian Police College has evolved into a Police University, and is awarding its first PhDs. It is also crucial that there is a new relationship between the police and higher education; not the type of relationship that Lord Trenchard would have approved of, but a grown up relationship of the type that O.W. Wilson alluded to, where higher education and policing come together and where we train and educate. Furthermore, where we move away from training about policing which is all about *'push'*; we push the training into people as they arrive and they spend the rest of their careers wishing to have their training 'pushed' into them, and don't take

responsibility for 'pulling' the training themselves. *'Pull'* training is the type of training that Universities seek to encourage; they seek to prepare the people they are educating for a life where they can go and find the training and the evidence, not a life where they can expect to be spoon fed.

I'm afraid to say that the police service has got to grow up, not just because of the finance, but because you cannot be professional in a 'push' model of education. That means that new entrants should be properly prepared for a role with a pre-entry qualification, because unless you are pre-qualified we are spoon-feeding you. We have to get over our nervousness about having Level 4 foundation degree, because policing is a complicated profession, and people need to be competent and prepared for it. Similarly, managers should be qualified to manage with a management qualification at Level 5, and I pay tribute to the Scots for having started down that road; and senior management should be prepared to lead and manage at strategic level with a Senior Management qualification at Level 7; a Master's degree of an appropriate form.

So it's not a traditional 'police college' that I propose south of the order, but a professional body which is not only responsible for delivery but for the educational and professional practice standards, rresearch, knowledge generation, dissemination and accreditation of practice. It starts on the first of December 2012, and I am delighted that Alex Marshall, previously the chief constable of Hampshire Constabulary, will be the first chief executive of the new National College of Policing.

We are at a point when O.W. Wilson's vision of police and Universities coming together to deliver a better society is essential for policing in the 21st century, and SIPR has placed Scotland in the vanguard; you have the basis for something really special in Scotland, and the way in which Professor Nick Fyfe and his team and the chief officers in Scotland have come together on this is deeply impressive. But this is the point at which to go further; the new Scottish Police Service can maintain that lead by developing clinical–academic partnerships in teaching and research. If Tulliallan carries on being a place where people do drill and where training is old fashioned training then I'm afraid we're in trouble. There has to be a moment of dramatic shift, where Tulliallan becomes either the campus of a University or moves to become part of a Scottish University.

There is a tendency for education in leadership and management to be divorced from science. There is a lot of good evidence based management literature out there (and I don't mean the kind of thing you find in airport bookshops) which is trying to ensure that scientific management takes place. And here in Scotland, where you have been hugely influential in the field of science that should be particular message is understood.

Figure 4: Evidence based decision making.

When I talk about evidence, I am not saying that you leave behind the managerial experience and professional knowledge that you have – of course you don't – but you also need to have a clear understanding of the organisational facts from your own data; there's no point going down a route which is completely a result of your stakeholders' values and concerns. Evidence doesn't sit in the back room; it sits in a set of requirements that look a bit like Figure 4.

It does mean for those of you who are leading the 'new profession' of policing – and I mean that with regard not just to those who are in the profession, but those involved in the governance of the profession – that the greater focus is moving away from inputs and outputs. 'How many have I got and how many detections have they produced?' is not particularly interesting. What's interesting is: 'what did they produce in terms of outcome? How many fewer crimes are there? How confident is the public?' Leaders therefore need to challenge practice with evidence and provide a vision to translate police activity into outcomes; it's not good enough to say 'crime went up', or 'crime went down'; you need a much more sophisticated approach. One also that pays attention to values and ethics; and if you think of the Hillsborough case, failure to pay attention to basic values and ethics has had a catastrophic effect on the public's confidence; and it doesn't matter if its 20 years later, the impact is *now*. Leaders need to be transformational but also 'authentic' (Adolf Hitler was a transformational leader, but he certainly wasn't authentic); and international in their outlook. Policing is a small world internationally, and there is good research going on everywhere, much of it is translatable. 'Not in my backyard' is not a good excuse for not listening to good practice properly generated elsewhere.

Professionals, led by well qualified leaders, with evidence based strategies. While social status and being recognized as professionals do matter, what matters more is the outcome that we achieve. Being more professional in the way that I have suggested is, I firmly believe, the way forward for a police service which must reinvent itself, almost 200 years on from its foundation.

Thank you.

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